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This dissertation serves to assess the economic and social effects of land reform 
policies in Brazil and South Africa. The paper presents a brief historical review of 
land issues, related land laws and regulations within each country. The study pays 
special attention to the ‘market-assisted’ approach to agrarian reform which has been 
promoted by the World Bank. It was found that this particular form of land reform has 
been achieving sub-optimal results in the countries in question. Rural poverty and 
inequality remain major issues in both countries, while the effects on the agricultural 
sector vary. South Africa’s agribusiness sector suffers whereas Brazil’s agribusiness 
industry thrives; the reasons behind these different outcomes are also discussed. 
Various alternate policy instruments from heterodox schools of economics are 
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“There is sufficiency in the world for man’s need but not for man’s greed”. 
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Preface: Heterodox Economics and the Distribution Issue 
 
Mainstream economics, with its neoclassical framework, is globally considered to be 
the orthodox way to study economic phenomena. It has been applied to economic 
analyses and policy-making since the latter 19th century, with it emerging as the 
dominant framework since World War II. There is wide agreement among 
practitioners that its framework provides an adequate benchmark with which to 
analyse ‘real-world’ scenarios. However, for decades, various groups have diverged 
from its conventions, and indeed its basic framework, to formulate their own 
economic principles and instruments of analysis, in an attempt to address its 
perceived shortcomings. This is especially evident in studies around market failure.  
There are, according to economists operating outside the orthodox framework, -  
referred to as heterodox economists - aspects of neoclassical economics which do 
not address important social issues.  
 
 
Lee (2012:339) explains that heterodox economics “refers to a particular group of 
contemporary theories aimed at explaining the social provisioning process, to 
economic policies recommendations predicated on the theories, and to a community 
of economists engaged in this theoretical and applied scientific activity.” It appears 
that mainstream economics offers inadequate explanatory power with regard to the 
process of social provisioning. Common themes among heterodox schools of thought 
are justice; wealth of nations; social relationships; accumulation; and economic 
issues pertaining to race, class and gender. The main concern for heterodox 
economists is usually to attain some acceptable level of social-wellbeing - which 
neoclassical economics pays little attention to - through the use of economic 
principles, tools and policies. Lee (2012: 340) captures the essence of heterodox 
economics in this excerpt:  
          
          “Because heterodox economics involves issues of ethical values and social 
philosophy and the historical aspects of human existence, heterodox economists feel 
that it is also their duty to make heterodox economic policy recommendations to 
improve human dignity, that is, recommending ameliorative and/or radical social and 
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economic policies to improve the social provisioning for all members of society and 
especially the disadvantaged.”  
 
Heterodox economists are of the view that their recommendations toward economic 
policy should stem from both the historical and theoretical portrayal of the actual 
workings of the economy, which pay special attention to “class and hierarchical 
domination, inequalities, social-economic discontent, and conflict” (Lee 2012:340). 
Therefore, it would seem more suitable to administer solutions from heterodox 
economics to help solve problems facing groups who are discriminated against, 
poorly employed, disadvantaged and highly dependent classes.  
 
Some economists, such as Dow (2013), go as far as to assert that economists 
should be obligated to adhere to an ethical code of conduct. This would ensure that 
policy-making would be governed by ethics, and thus the factor of ‘social duty’ would 
always be accounted for. This could possibly help to reduce the effects of market 
failure with its detrimental impact on the poorest classes within society.  
 
A school that has been dealing with these issues is the Institutionalist School, which 
was founded by the American economist Thorstein Veblen, towards the latter part of 
the 19th century (Brue & Grant 2007). The unique American economic environment of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries created an atmosphere for intense discussion 
and debate that often questioned the status quo. It was from this intellectual 
environment that Institutional economics emerged with it questioning the 
assumptions and conclusions of neoclassical economics.  The school developed 
over time to take a reformist approach to tackling the issue of social change, which is 
a far cry from the pragmatic reforms supported by the Neoclassical School. 
Pragmatic reforms would aid in preserving existing capitalist structures while 
reformism aims to change the fundamental structure of the socioeconomic system 
within a society, hence diverging from mainstream thought (Brue & Grant 2007). 
 
However, Institutional Economics is not alone in diverging from orthodox economics. 
There are several heterodox schools that deviate from neoclassical economics in an 
attempt to address social issues: ecological economics, feminist economics, 




Important themes that have often provoked divergence from the mainstream have 
been land ownership and property rights. Many heterodox schools have criticised the 
neoclassical stance around these topics. While neoclassical theory refers to and 
values land simply as an input in production, various heterodox schools have refuted 
this view insisting that land has an intrinsic value that cannot be ignored. The issue of 
the value of land have, throughout centuries, sparked interest from several 
philosophers, economists and politicians such as John Locke, Henry George, Pierre-











Chapter 1     Introduction 
 
1.1  Introduction to the Topic  
The topic chosen for this dissertation is ‘the effects of land reform on developing 
nations’. Since the topic of land reform can be a rather extensive one, the topic 
presented here is an analysis of the land reform programmes implemented in two 
developing economies forming part of the BRICS countries: Brazil and South Africa. 
Brazil and South Africa have been chosen for this study as these would be the most 
appropriate of the BRICS economies that can be comparable in terms of economic 
structure, levels of inequality, agrarian culture and dependencies, and a common 
history of colonization. Both countries have also, in more recent times, been brought 
to the forefront of land reform talks on global forums.  Although Russia, India, and 
China have too implemented some land reform programmes, these have not been a 
major focus for the governments concerned. Additionally, the economic and political 
structures as well as sizes of these economies are vastly more different to those of 
South Africa and Brazil.  
 
The themes within the dissertation are income inequality, distribution, poverty, 
property/land rights and agricultural productivity. This study focuses on land reform 
within the realm of private property ownership involving the influence of the 
community and intervention from the state through some political process. There are 
several proposed solutions which act as alternates to land reform programmes. 
 
 
1.2  What does this dissertation aim to achieve? 
This dissertation is titled The ‘Land Debate’: Is Land Reform the Solution? An 
Analysis of Brazil and South Africa, implying that the study involves assessing the 
economic and social impact that land reform programmes have had on the respective 
countries. To state the purpose of this assessment would be: to argue that the 
existing programmes of land reform being implemented in Brazil and South Africa are 
inefficient and ineffective. The objective of this study is to attempt to provide evidence 
to prove that these land reform programmes have been mostly unsuccessful, while 
providing reasoning for why this is the case by identifying shortfalls. This dissertation 
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also aims to propose various alternate solutions. The alternate solutions are 
expected to better address poverty, inequity, and unequal distribution; while also 
maintaining agricultural productivity.  
 
 
1.3  Method used to achieve aims 
A qualitative approach is adopted for this research topic. The topic is largely based 
on theories, policies, existing economic reports, and is also closely linked to political 
issues. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyse the existing theories and research to 
identify areas with gaps or failure to adequately solve problems. A qualitative 
analysis allows for a more in-depth study of the impact that policy has on human 
beings within the respective societies in relation to the economy as a whole. A 
descriptive analysis of existing data is undertaken. In doing so, an analysis of the 
performance reported from the initiation of the land reform programmes up until 
recent years is conducted. Sources of information and data which have been used 
include, but are not limited to journal articles, government websites, statistical and 
research organisation websites. 
 
 
1.4 Significance of the topic 
The redistribution of wealth and the alleviation of poverty are major areas of concern 
in developing economies. The chosen countries for the study are: 1) Brazil, 2) South 
Africa. Considering the BRICS economies, Brazil has the most easily comparable 
economic environment and structure to South Africa. In the case of Brazil, land 
reform policy requires much attention as there exist major land monopolies that 
dominate the agricultural and industrial sectors. Land reform policy in South Africa is 
taken seriously as a means to reduce the negative effects of colonialism and 
Apartheid in order to create a more equal distribution of wealth and eradicate the 
remnants of racist laws; to impact income inequality to reach a more even distribution 
of wealth; to create more equal opportunities; and to promote agricultural 
entrepreneurship within smaller farming communities. Land reform policy is proving 
to be helpful (although minimally) in achieving goals of poverty alleviation and wealth 
equality. However, the extent to which it is positively impacting the agricultural sector 
and society is questionable.  
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1.5  Brief Overview 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic, and describes the aims and significance of the topic. 
 
Chapter 2 explains the Neoclassical and heterodox approaches to the use of land as 
a resource. 
 
Chapter 3 sets the foundation for analysis by outlining any theoretical components 
and describing the background and history of the topic. The related property theories 
are discussed and relevant literature is reviewed.  A brief overview of examples of 
land reform on a global scale are discussed.  
 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
The historical importance of the topic is discussed to show how past events have 
shaped present-day policy. These chapters put forward the ultimate reasons for the 
conception of land reform policies in each country and thereafter presents the 
analysis. This involves the isolation of studies and reports pertaining to each country 
that contain information and data related to the effects of modern-day land reform 
policy. The methods of policy implementation within each country are discussed in 
order to ascertain the objectives and changes being made on a societal level. An 
assessment of the effects on the agricultural sector of the economy; the growth of the 
economy; and the alleviation of rural poverty is presented.  
 
Chapter 6 offers a comparative analysis of the results in Brazil and South Africa. 
Results are also contrasted with positive outcomes in the Philippines.  
 
Chapter 7 proposes alternate solutions to achieving equity and poverty alleviation. 
 
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by summarising the findings and stating the 







Chapter 2       The Economics of Land 
 
Before delving into the topic itself it may be helpful to understand the economics 
behind natural resources, and thus the way in which land is treated and measured by 
the neoclassical school. It is through this understanding that more light is shed upon 
why various heterodox schools have criticised the neoclassical method of land 
valuation. Additionally, it is important to gain a more holistic view of the state of 
affairs with regard to land through understanding the types of economic systems that 
have had a hand in shaping the market structures that exist in Brazil and South Africa 
today. This chapter provides a brief explanation. 
 
2.1 Neoclassical Economics 
The neoclassical treatment of land is best understood by considering the production 
function. The production function measures output (Y) as a function of labour (L) and 
capital (K) while the quantity and quality of output also depends on the state of 
technology applied (Hussen 2004:8). Land or natural resources are within this 
conceptual framework not accounted for as a separate input.  
 
Neoclassical economists thus classify land as a natural resource along with all other 
naturally occurring inputs such as air and water. This classification of land is 
supported by the definition of land outlined by the OECD: “natural assets (raw 
materials) occurring in nature that can be used for economic production or 
consumption” (OECD 2001). This contrasts with several heterodox schools who 
argue that natural resources cannot simply be categorised as capital as these are not 
man-made, but should rather be valued according to the intrinsic value that is held. 
 
However, going a step further to unravel the neoclassical approach to land brings to 
light a part of neoclassical theory that does not regard naturally occurring 
commodities as ‘land’ once it has been extracted from the earth and or transformed 
into tradable condition, in this state it is called capital (Batt 2003:4). An example of 
this is a fish; when still at sea it is land/natural resources but once caught for 
consumption or sale is regarded as capital. It is this method of valuation that is often 
criticised by deviant groups as wrong and unethical.  
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The workings of any economy are strongly influenced by the physical environment in 
which it operates. While neoclassical theory acknowledges the problem of scarcity 
prevalent in these physical environments and that the issue of limited resources 
requires attention, many of the underlying assumptions used in providing solutions 
are in themselves problematic. Hussen (2004:4) lists the key neoclassical 
assumptions related to natural resources (land):  
1. Natural resources are a necessary (even if minimal) input for production 
2. Scarcity of natural resources is the only major concern 
3. Natural capital and man-made capital have characteristics that will allow for 
perfect substitutability 
4. Technology enhancements will allow for greater levels of production from a 
fixed amount of natural resources 
5. The economy is independent of the natural ecosystem of the environment.  
 
These assumptions are flawed for a few reasons. Hussen (2004) argues that firstly, 
the scarcity issue is made far less significant if it is believed that natural and man-
made capital are perfect substitutes. This would mean that should technological 
advancement allow for it, the issue of limited natural resources will be non-existent 
due to the infinite possibility for man-made resources to be substituted for natural 
resources in the production process. Second, the assumption that the economy 
develops independently of the ecosystem of its environment is risky. The economy is 
inherently impacted by the environment in which it operates, which includes the 
ecosystem of that environment. Where human beings are a pivotal part of a process, 
the ecosystem which supports them naturally must play a role in that process too. 
Thirdly, due to the unique value added from the natural environment, it cannot simply 
be a matter of price signals from market demand and supply interactions assigning a 
value to these natural resources. In doing this, the intrinsic value is lost. This means 
that any value that is not measured by some economic indicator is not accounted for. 
The more accurate way to consider natural resources such as land is to account for 
the transfer of energy and thus the value added from the natural environment into the 
production process which creates some form of utility (Hussen 2004:15). This is not 
to say that neoclassical theory has ‘gotten it all wrong’, these are just a few 
assumptions that are refuted by several heterodox schools such as ecological 
economics and Georgism.  
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2.2 Structure of the Economy 
The different economic systems/structures that exist will also vary in their methods of 
the treatment of land, hence the approach to how land is valued within an economy is 
not just confined to the school of economic thought applied, but also includes the 
economic structure that has been adopted by the society involved. Economic 
structure can be traditional, feudal, command, or liberal market. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn.  
 
The traditional economic system is one where the culture, traditions and beliefs of a 
society greatly impact the way in which the economy operates. In such an economy 
the activities involved in producing goods and services will be closely linked to the 
livelihood of the people in that community. According to Alexander (1976:57), the 
traditional economy values land and natural resources as the most integral factors of 
production while capital and technology play a very small role. Communities within a 
traditional economy will usually rely directly on the land for survival through activities 
such as hunting, gathering and farming. The method of trade is often bartering or 
basic forms of hand-to-hand exchanges. Due to the heavy weighting placed on land 
in this type of economy, the neoclassical production function would be inappropriate. 
Both Brazil and South Africa were originally traditional economies prior to 
colonization. 
 
Feudal economy refers to a system in which there exists a hierarchical ordering of 
different classes of society, often the best example is that of Medieval Europe. The 
importance placed upon agriculture was high as those who worked the land paid 
rents in the form of produce to the Lords who owned the land, this was also referred 
to as the Manorial System. It was only when the barter system died out and the 
monetary exchange system began to grow that the feudal economy too began to 
wane (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986). During the colonization period of Brazil, the 
feudal system was imposed on Brazilians by the Portuguese (more details in chapter 
4). 
 
The command economy is one in which economic power is concentrated as it is 
under a communist or dictatorship ruling (Painter 2008). The theory states that all 
natural resources including land are claimed and owned by the state. The 
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government controls the economy by holding the power to make all distribution and 
production decisions within the economy (Lazarev 2001). Some examples of this 
type of economy are the old Soviet Union, China before it started to liberalise its 
economy after 1979 and North Korea.  
 
The liberal market economy (also called the free-market) where all the factors of 
production as well as distribution are controlled by the market is rare, as it is not 
usual to find a country where all economic activity is left completely ungoverned by 
the state. The more common structure is the mixed economy where market players 
are allowed to interact freely, with some limited degree of intervention or guidance 
from the state (Ikeda 2002). The current economic structure of both Brazil and South 
Africa would fall into this category. However, this has not always been the case. The 
mixed economy that exists today is the outcome of westernization of the once 
traditional economies that existed before the west ‘discovered’ and conquered these 
lands. Although both Brazil and South Africa initially operated within traditional 
economies, colonization introduced new influences which in both countries had 
lasting impacts. Brazil was forced into a feudal system, while the South African 
economy was heavily influenced by customs and developments from Western 
Europe, particularly the Netherlands and Britain.  
 
Considering the once traditional economies that existed in Brazil and South Africa, it 
is easy to see why the introduction of western forces and the neoclassical model was 
not embraced by the indigenous people of these countries. For a people who value 
land and natural resources above all other factors of production and to whom the 
value of the earth and all that it offers is held in the greatest esteem, to diminish that 
value and force them to make a living within an economy with monetary exchanges 
and market forces from private and public sectors can only result in conflict. Hence, 
this is where we are, asking questions such as: Why are people struggling in poverty, 
when land is abundant? And what has become of the once rich agricultural sectors of 






Chapter 3    Painting the Landscape 
            
           “And the great owners, who must lose their land in an upheaval, the great owners with 
access to history, with eyes to read history and to know the great fact: when property 
accumulates in too few hands it is taken away. And that companion fact: when a 
majority of the people are hungry and cold they will take by force what they need. And 
the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to 
strengthen and knit the repressed.” 
            - John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath.  
 
The purpose of land reform policy is to redistribute the land (and thus land rights) in 
an attempt to reach a more equitable distribution of land so as to help alleviate 
poverty and improve well-being; a summation of the aims of the White Paper on Land 
Policy of 1997 in South Africa. James (2001:93) reinforces this notion of land reform 
policy by explaining that “Reforming its ownership, and redistributing it to the poorer 
sectors of society is thought to provide the key to solving poverty and inequality, and 
is seen as the starting point in any real debate in redistributing wealth”. Land reform 
policies are developed as a mechanism through which to provide property rights to 
disadvantaged groups who are often displaced, dispossessed and do not hold a title 
for the land upon which they live.  
 
The need for the reform of land stems from social inequalities, specifically the 
inequalities of wealth and income. Thus the primary reason for the development of 
land reform policies is to address this issue of inequality. Land reform as an area of 
research seems to lack a mechanism with which to measure the efficiency of policy. 
Possible reasons are that most cases of land reform, resulting in significant changes, 
tend to be accompanied by social upheaval, while the problems of data limitations 
make the analysis of effects difficult (Lambais et al. 2013:7). This has resulted in the 
heated debate, on whether or not land reform is the answer to alleviating rural 
poverty and creating a more equitable distribution of wealth, remaining unfinished. 
This land question is under investigation on a global scale and is not only relevant to 
Brazil and South Africa. The question to be asked is how does a country maintain 
production and growth in agriculture but also alleviate the poverty under which the 
majority of its people are living? Is the implementation of ‘market-assisted’ agrarian 
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reform the most efficient solution with adequate consideration for achieving the social 
good?  
 
The economic perspective of property rights can be traced back many years to the 
likes of John Locke, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, Henry George, Ronald 
Coase, and Garret Hardin. A major contribution made to the ‘Theory of Property 
Rights’ within the field of economics was by Harold Demsetz (1967); with other more 
recent contributions from Yoram Barzel (1989), Gary Libecap (1989), Douglass North 
(1990) and Oliver Hart (1995); works which have been discussed and compared by 
Mahoney (2005).  
 
Gary Libecap (1989) points out that often the laws created to regulate property rights 
inefficiencies are closely related to political interests and serve only as a temporary 
relief from inefficiency (Mahoney 2005). According to Mahoney (2005:110) politicians 
have incentives not to interfere with status quo rankings in society. Thus, inefficient 
systems of property rights prevail. Yoram Barzel is of the opinion that property rights 
are never fully delineated due to the high costs involved with accurately measuring 
the value of any asset; leading to the high risk that assets may then be wrongfully 
appropriated by others (Mahoney 2005:110). Hence, the system of property rights is 
once more inefficient. Understanding the basic economic principles behind the 
concept of property rights and the related inefficiencies sets the theoretical 
foundation for this study.  
 
 
3.1 The Theory of Property Rights 
Property rights within a community can be delineated as “the set of economic and 
social relations defining the position of each individual with respect to the utilization of 
scarce resources” (Furubotn and Pejovich 1972:1139). Recent studies indicate that 
weak property rights are widely prevalent throughout the world, which leaves millions 
of residents without land titles for the land upon which they live (Galiani and 
Schargrodsky 2010:700). The primary result of this is that when weak property rights 
exist in unequal societies, such as those found in developing nations, wealthier 
individuals have no incentive to encourage the state to develop a stronger system of 
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property rights distribution in order to increase land security among the poor; and so 
the gap between the rich and poor grows (Macours et al. 2010:881).  
 
Furubotn and Pejovich (1972:1139) describe ‘property rights’ as “the sanctioned 
behavioral relations among men that arise from the existence of things and pertain to 
their use”. Thus, property rights do not refer to the direct relationship between human 
beings and things; but is influenced by behaviour and incentives associated with the 
right to use these things. Taking a more labour related view was John Locke (1690) 
who theorised the possession of property through labour by arguing “that an original 
owner is one who mixes his or her labor with a thing and, by commingling that labor 
with the thing, establishes ownership of it” (Rose 1985:73). Locke (1690) also 
asserted that humanity should collectively decide who the original owner of property 
should be, however there lies some fault in this assertion in that it would be difficult -
to say the least- to actually gather a consensus from all of humanity. Nevertheless 
there still exists the notion of property, or natural resources, having some level of 
community involvement in its ownership. Locke (1690) goes on to add that one would 
have to hold a natural right to a resource as it is an essential condition in order for 
production to occur.    
  
Müller and Sikor (2009:1311) explain that the economic interpretation of property 
rights to land change in response to shifts in the productive values of land, thus 
accounting for changes in technological conditions and economic environment. 
Property rights within a community are responsible for setting the economic and 
social environment which defines the position held by every individual in terms of 
their access and ability to use a scarce resource/asset. Furubotn and Pejovich 
(1972:1139) further illustrate this concept using a quote by Alchian (1967): 
            
           “In essence, economics is the study of property rights over scarce resources. . . . The 
allocation of scarce resources in a society is the assignment of rights to uses of 
resources . . . the question of economics, or of how prices should be determined, is 
the question of how property rights should be defined and exchanged, and on what 




This implies that holding the right of ownership in a scarce resource/asset entitles the 
owner to participate in a number of optional activities. These activities include; using 
the resource, changing its form, or transferring the rights to another party through 
sale or rental.  According to Demsetz (1967), the owner of a property right expects 
that the community will act to deter any parties from interfering with the chosen 
activities of the owner, insofar as these activities are in compliance with the terms 
attached to the rights.  
Demsetz (1967:352) delineates three forms of property rights ownership: 1) 
communal ownership; 2) private ownership; 3) state ownership.  These are explained 
in turn: 
1) Communal ownership refers to a right belonging to every member of a 
community. The right is communal if all members are able to exercise that 
right. An example of this is the right to walk on a street sidewalk.  
2) Private ownership allows the holder of the right to exclude others from 
benefiting from the owner’s private right to a particular resource. An example 
is the right one has to the use of their own motor vehicle, which excludes 
others from using it.  
3) State ownership gives the state the authority to decide who to exclude from 
the use of a right, with the condition that the state adheres to any political 
procedures that are associated with such exclusion.   
 
Land reform pertains primarily to concerns arising from private property ownership 
where there is a disproportionate pattern of private property rights which leads to 
wealth and inequalities. Gary Libecap (1989) points out that, integral to property 
rights determination is some political process, often involving negotiations and 
lobbying; ensuring that property rights are created and regulated by political entities 
(Mahoney 2005:112). In addition, property rights are reflective of the conflict of 
economic interests and differences in the bargaining power of the parties being 
affected (Mahoney 2005:111). According to Yoram Barzel, it is the high cost involved 
in measuring an asset that deters the complete delineation of rights, and so there is 
always the risk of appropriation by others through free-riding and adverse selection 




Taking a different approach to the weakness of property rights is Douglass North, 
who goes a step further by asserting that one of the primary reasons for insufficient 
economic development present throughout the world is that there exists inefficient 
property rights systems that continue to persist over time (Mahoney 2005:118). 
According to Douglass North, societies have - throughout history - failed to enforce 
contracts, which has led to the stagnation of economic development in third world 
countries (Mahoney 2000:122). The issue of wealth inequality as a product of weak 
property rights regimes is highly prevalent in developing nations with the additional 




3.2 Land Reform and the World 
State-led land reform has become enormously popular within third world nations; 
specifically in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, China, India, Philippines, 
Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Governments have begun to recognize the 
need to issue formal land titles to indigenous groups as a way to preserve and 
respect tradition, culture and history. It has become increasingly recognized that 
historically marginalized societies receive what is rightfully theirs, as a way to reach a 
more equitable distribution of assets. 
 
However, the area of growing concern is the issue of ‘redistribution’ of land. The 
International Land Coalition is a global organization, concerned with the accessibility 
of land for the rural poor, that was established to form a network for effective 
communication between governments and societies. Programs have been 
implemented in a number of African and Latin American regions, which redistributes 
land belonging to wealthy landowners to poor landless people in an attempt to 
alleviate poverty and reduce the glaring gap between the rich and poor. The aim is 
always to improve the land rights of disadvantaged groups and raise living standards. 
This has caught the attention of both the European Union and the World Bank, who 
have issued a number of new policies and guidelines pertaining to land reform. Some 
of the main guidelines outlined by the World Bank in the ‘Land Reform Policy Paper’ 
are:  the maintenance and promotion of owner-operated family farms; “the need for 
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markets to permit land to be transferred to more productive users; and the 
importance of an egalitarian asset distribution” (Deininger and Binswanger 1999).  
 
According to Müller and Sikor (2009), land reform is thought of as a key element to 
any effective process that aims to bring about social transformation. For those 
nations who have undergone revolutions, such as the Russian Revolution, land 
reform has played a major role in the transformation process as it has aided in 
breaking the societal ‘class’ divisions. These land reforms have involved state-led 
redistributions of land from large and wealthy landowners to the poor landless or to 
smallholders (Müller and Sikor 2009). In such cases, the government expects the 
land reforms to help in meeting the demands of the poor through reducing the power 
held by the large landowners. Müller and Sikor (2009) explain that this is also a way 
for the state to boost their political support among the poor masses. “Implemented 
properly by a national government and administration with international assistance, 
land reform was expected to alleviate rural poverty, increase agricultural productivity, 
and strengthen the new nation state” (Müller and Sikor 2009:1308). Land reform had 
reached Africa by the 1970s/1980s as a result of an issuance by the World Bank of a 
key land policy statement during 1975 (Müller and Sikor 2009:1308). The 
redistribution of land has since become an important policy tool in the developing 
world.  
 
Examples of land reform policy implementations are found across the globe, from 
China to Europe. Earlier programmes of land reform from France and Russia are 
also worth noting. Prerevolutionary France saw that the Church dominated politics 
and the ownership of land, especially the agricultural economy through the rural 
aristocrats. The Church would charge an annual land tax by collecting a portion of 
the harvest which were called tithes (The Saylor Foundation 2012). The private 
aristocrats would also charge rents and taxes to the peasants who worked the land 
under a feudal system. The French Revolution overturned both the Church’s and 
aristocrats’ power by abolishing feudalism along with the rents and taxes charged, as 
well as confiscating the land owned by the Church. In the case of Russia, in the 
years prior to the revolution and throughout all of history, it has always been the 
peasants who have depended on the land for their livelihoods. The peasants were of 
the belief that those who worked the land should own the land. Hence, the ‘Stolypin 
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Land Reforms’ were passed between 1905 and 1917 in an attempt to avoid a 
peasant revolt (Yaney 1964). The ‘obshchina’, which were communal lands that were 
run by village governments, were done away with as the ‘Stolypin Land Reforms’ 
introduced private individual land ownership to the peasants in the hope that this 
would satisfy their desire for property rights and encourage them to engage in more 
profit-driven agricultural operations (Lipton and Sachs 1992). On the Asian front, 
Deng and Huang (2003:211) bring to light the lack of research on the efficiency of 
urban reform, also recognizing that urban sprawl forms the epicenter of land debates 
in China. As part of the land reform programmes, China has established 
‘development zones’. However, these areas have yet to positively impact the rural 
poor while remaining largely unoccupied.  
 
Other cases of land reform inefficiencies come from most of Eastern and Central 
Europe, where agrarian reform has taken centre stage (Swinnen 1999:638). The 
countries referred to in Swinnen’s (1999) study are Bulgaria, Germany, Czech 
Republic, Albania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Russia, Latvia, 
Ukraine and Lithuania; all of which have exhibited poor results.  In contrast, land 
reform in the Philippines is being implemented with what appears to be a relatively 
successful outcome (Borras 2001:546). When compared with results from South 
Africa, El Salvador and Zimbabwe; redistributive land reform has reported 
significantly greater successes and improvements in the Philippines (Borras 
2001:552). According to Bernstein (2002:436), land and property rights struggles 
have recurred over hundreds of years in countries such as “Russia and Mexico; 
eastern and southeastern Europe and China; and Bolivia in the 1950s, Vietnam and 
Algeria in the 1950s and 1960s, Peru in the 1960s, and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 
1980s”; and so the issue of land reform has played a central role in economic 
development throughout recent history, making even greater waves in the 20th and 
21st centuries.  
 
Land reform has evolved over time to its present day description which is not merely 
the redistribution of land from large landowners to poor landless people; it now 
encompasses an array of tools and procedures such as: the colonization of land that 
is publicly owned, improvement in tenancy, titling and registration of land, 
consolidating holdings that are fragmented, and forms of taxation of land (Müller and 
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Sikor 2009). This has enlarged the pool of administrative and legal tools available to 
governments that can be implemented in the enhancement of land rights for the 
disadvantaged. Müller and Sikor (2009) identify three primary types of land reform:  
1) Redistributive land reform – The redistribution of land and agrarian reforms 
involve the government-led expropriation of land from the large landowners 
which are then reallocated and administered to poor rural groups. A variation 
of this is termed ‘market-assisted’ land reform where the large landowners and 
aspiring smallholders negotiate and transact via the market; a process which 
is then facilitated by loans granted by the state. Hence, the redistribution of 
land relies quite heavily on the existing land/property market in the country, 
based on the presumption that the potential recipients of the land will be 
equipped to engage with this existing market (Jacobs et al 2003). Examples of 
this can be found in Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa (Müller and Sikor 
2009).  
  
2) Land registration and land titling – Registration and titling are popular in Sub-
Saharan Africa and include considerations for claims on land made by ethnic 
groups and indigenous peoples. It is a western concept tied to land ownership 
and is used as a method to return land that was once communal but had been 
claimed by the state. This model of private ownership conflicts with the 
traditional African culture of communally owned land (Cousins 2002). Hence, 
the introduction of land titling is problematic in that although it returns the land 
to those who originally occupied it, it does so with the property rights pertinent 
to the western laws of private property. According to Cousins (2002:4) “the 
inevitable result of titling is to create massive boundary disputes, between 
adjacent communities and within levels of social and political organization. 
These have been evident in many of the tenure reform ‘test cases’ 
investigated by the department of land affairs over the past seven years”. 
 
3) Post-totalitarian land distributions – A mechanism that allows those who in the 
past have had their land forcefully taken from them by totalitarian 
governments, to now have their land re-administered to them. An example of 
this can be seen in post-Apartheid South Africa, where the land restitution 
programme allows citizens to reclaim land that was appropriated from them 
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under past policies of racial discrimination.  The land that is distributed under 
this mechanism is usually state-owned and is often handed over to those who 
are active within the agricultural sector. 
 
For the purpose of this study, the primary focus is on the impact of the ‘market-
assisted’ approach to land reform which is dominant in Brazil and South Africa. The 
following two chapters provide a brief history of the political and economic 


























Chapter 4    Brazil 
 
 
4.1 Background to the Brazilian Case 
For many years, Brazilians have associated wealth with land ownership. During the 
period of colonization, the Portuguese King John III divided Brazil into 15 sections of 
land which were then entrusted to a few aristocratic families that consisted primarily 
of “minor nobles, military commanders, and bureaucrats close to the monarchy” 
(Fernandes et al. 2012:16). Attached to each large section of land was ‘hereditary 
succession’, ensuring that future generations of these families would be provided for. 
This European feudal system which was imposed upon Brazil has greatly impacted 
the land ownership patterns in the country.  
 
 
During the colonization of Brazil by the Portuguese in the 1530s, the Portuguese 
King divided Brazil into 15 large sections of land called ‘capitanias hereditárias’, 
meaning hereditary captaincies (Assunção 2006). Each section was donated to a 
Portuguese captain with complete authority and hereditary succession. However, 
only two ‘capitanias’ had survived by the middle of the 16th century (Fernandes et al. 
2012). When the 17th century arrived, it brought with it an increase in the worldwide 
demand for sugar, leading to yet another land distribution initiative by the 
Portuguese. This time land was distributed as an incentive for the cultivation and 
production of sugar; this land was referred to as ‘sesmarias’ (Assunção 2006). As 
long as the owners of the ‘sesmarias’ continued to cultivate, they would retain 
complete property rights to the land; and so this key condition remained throughout 
the agrarian history of Brazil (Assunção 2006).  
 
Slash-and-burn land treatment became the norm as it was an easier method of land 
preparation for the large landowners. A trend arose allowing large landowners to 
control vast areas of land, while small areas of land were exploited and overworked 
by the poor peasants (Fernandes et al. 2012). Finally, Brazil won its independence in 
1822, which also brought the ‘sesmaria’ system to an end. Between 1822 and 1850, 
the lack of formal land policy administration led to the development of massive 
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squatter settlements. However, during 1850 the influence of coffee plantation owners 
resulted in the passing of the Land Act, which has had a great influence on 
ownership patterns seen today. The 1850 Land Act aimed to valorize property in land 
through the regulation of commercialization which attracted workers from various 
countries, promising them land upon which they could live (Fernandes et al. 2012). 
The Land Act disallowed squatting as a form of land claim, and thus restricted the 
avenues of acquisition of land solely to purchasing. Even so, all the existing squatters 
were made legal and the ‘sesmarias’ were reintroduced. Land remained in the hands 
of a wealthy few, while the poor majorities were forced to work the large farms and 
plantations knowing that they could not acquire land of their own (Assunção 2006). 
This has resulted in Brazil having one of the most disproportionate and skewed 
distributions of land in the world. In addition, the distribution of income is significantly 
unequal. A land reform programme was implemented in 1964 in an attempt to 
improve inequality and intensify the use of land.  
 
Land reform in Brazil began with the Land Act of 1964 which focused mainly on 
agrarian reform and stated that if an individual maintained effective use of the land 
for at least a year that individual could claim ownership of that land (Crittenden 
1997). Two organizations were formed as a result: the Brazilian Institute for Agrarian 
Reform (IBRA) and the National Institute for Agricultural Development (INDA); which 
merged in 1971 to become the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian 
Reform (INCRA). The Land Act of 1964 aimed to dissuade moves toward land 
redistribution; instead it entailed the “modernisation of the large landholders by 
means of subsidized rural credit” (Assunção 2006:6). According to Fernandes et al. 
(2012:22) the influence of large landowners led to the passing of the Act in support of 
“state investment in the modernisation of large-scale agriculture and the 
consolidation of agro-industries”. It was only in 1985, when democracy returned to 
the country, that the very first formal policy called the National Agrarian Reform Plan 
(1985-1989) was initiated. Initially the disappropriation achieved was only 10% 
(Assunção 2006) of what had been planned for; nevertheless it had gotten the ball 
rolling, but not for long. Fernando Collor de Mello’s - president of the time - 
implementation of the reform plan was so weak that it almost brought the process to 




Collor’s replacement, President Cardoso, hastened the reform process during his 
reign in office; a period that was plagued with land conflicts and invasions that were 
led by the organisation called ‘The Landless Workers Movement’ (also known as the 
‘MST’). The majority of the population have been up in arms at the appalling 3% who 
own two thirds of the country’s agricultural land, which is prevalent even today 
(McKenna 2004:21). Toward the end of Cardoso’s reign, land reform began to evolve 
to take on a new form which involved negotiations and was termed ‘market-assisted’, 
paving the way for the present-day reform policy.  
 
However, significant change is yet to be seen. Table 4.1 (see Appendix) displays a 
record of the disappropriation of land under the reign of each presidency from 1979 
to 2003 (Assunção 2006:9). Here, it can be seen that under Cardoso’s reign the 
reform process was accelerated with a cumulative total of 3588 events of 
disappropriation and 10,346,344 hectares of land. This was a drastic improvement 
compared to the presidency of Collor, which saw only 7 events of disappropriation 
and a mere 15,065 hectares of land being redistributed. Although strides have been 
made from 1995 onwards, these strides have not been major enough to fully impact 
the population. The landless peasants remain dissatisfied, and inequality in the 
distribution of land and income persist.  
 
Assunção (2006:3) describes some of the determinants of present-day land 
concentration in Brazil (aside form historical influences). The shape of the 
macroeconomy over recent years has greatly affected the distribution of land. During 
periods of greater instability in the macroeconomy, people tend to increase their 
demand for land as a buffer to protect themselves against uncertainty and risky 
events (Assunção 2006:3). When inefficiencies in the land rental market are also 
taken into account, coupled with an unstable macroeconomy, this leads to high 
concentrations of land (Assunção 2006:3). These high land concentrations are at the 
heart of the ongoing unrest in Brazil.  
 
Years of dismissing the pleas and needs of the landless peasants has resulted in the 
Landless Workers’ Movement (MST) becoming the largest social movement in Latin 
America (Almeida and Johnston 2006:10). The new democracy in Brazil not only 
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allowed for the Landless Workers Movement to be formed, but also introduced free-
market forces into the agricultural industry of Brazil (McKenna 2004:23).  
 
The MST, since its formation, has adopted several strategies and methods of 
claiming land for the members of the movement and other landless peasant groups. 
A general three-step procedure is followed when a piece of land is found. First, 
members will occupy the land; second, they will resist the landlords’ and 
government’s attempts to forcibly remove them from the newly occupied land; and 
third, they will begin agricultural production on the land (McKenna 2004:24). The 
second stage has been the cause of much upheaval and improper conduct of 
members. According to reports from MST leaders, this process of land claim has 
been successful in a few cases (McKenna 2004:24). Peasants can then live securely 
on their land and enjoy the fruits of their labour, either through subsistence farming or 
by farming for the provision of products in the marketplace. However, the process is 
tedious, long, disruptive and risky – coming at a high cost. The failure of land reform 
policy to be effectively executed results in unrest, leading to economic disturbances 
and instability.  João Pedro Stedile (a leader of MST) provides the main reason for 
this failure in execution as follows; there exists insufficient clarity of the details 
pertaining to the land reform policy in Brazil (McKenna 2004:30) therefore people are 
ignorant as to what to expect or what to carry out in their duties and roles as 
negotiators.  
 
Brazil appears to fit the relevant theory in that it has included a ‘classical capitalist 
land reform’ in its policy which breaks up large pieces of land into smaller pieces for 
redistribution. However, in practice the World Bank reported that the system being 
used to reform land instead bears closer resemblance to what is called the 
‘settlement method’ where the government confiscates or buys the land from the 
large landowners and transfers ownership to peasants in order to avoid any further 
uproars (McKenna 2004:30). This type of land reform procedure is costly, highly 
inefficient and time consuming. The ongoing turmoil has had detrimental effects on 
the economy and on society as a whole.  
 
Recent studies by the UN Development Programme of 2007 indicate that 45% of the 
income in Brazil accrues to only 10% of the population, while a pitiful 3% of the 
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income accrues to 20% of the population – resulting in one of the most unequal 
distributions of income in the world (Carter 2010:189). Carter (2010:189) describes 
the position of rural Brazil; “a highly modernized and dynamic agricultural economy 
coexists with a pauperized society in which more than half the population lives below 
the national poverty line”. It is shocking to note that Brazil is internationally known for 
being a major player in the exportation markets for beef, sugar, soybeans and coffee 
beans; and yet it was reported by the World Bank (2005) that 14% of the population 
suffer from hunger (Carter 2010:190). Aside from the persistence of high levels of 
poverty, compared with other Latin American countries, Brazil has shown the least 
improvement through land reform programmes and land reallocations while being the 
fifth largest country in the world (Carter 2010:191); this appears to be an illogical 
result - surely something is seriously amiss.  
 
4.2 Impact in Brazil 
Agrarian land in Brazil is split between minifundia and latifundia. Minifundia refers to 
a small piece of land upon which peasant farmers live and work primarily for the 
purpose of subsistence production; while latifundia is a large expanse of land or an 
estate which is owned by a large/wealthy landowner but is not necessarily fully 
utilized for farming. The underutilization of latifundias is what led the land reform 
authorities to believe that even if land were to be redistributed on a significantly large 
scale, this would not negatively impact the level of agricultural production in the 
country (Baer and Filizzola 2005:3). Hence, it would not be necessary to make any 
trade-off between efficiency and equity.  
 
Initially the ideology that promoted the reform of agrarian land was that medium-sized 
family farms were the most efficient and that when inequality is present in land 
ownership patterns this inevitably leads to inefficiencies (Baer and Filizzola 2005:3). 
However, certain events within the agricultural sector have proved otherwise. The 
21st century brought with it a boom in agricultural production at a national level, the 
result of major advancements in the modernization of the agri-business sector which 
is closely associated with the introduction of strong neo-liberal trade policies (Baer 
and Filizzola 2005:4). However, this was opposed by forces such as ‘The Landless 
Workers’ Movement’ who began rallying against the high concentration of land 
ownership within Brazil. According to Carter (2010:190) a fifth of the Brazilian 
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population resides and works in the rural country-side, however more than a quarter 
of the national farmland area is left unproductive.    
 
Although Brazil’s agricultural sector was sorely neglected during the 1950s and 
1960s, its growth of agricultural output surpassed the growth of the population. 
However, this growth in output occurred mostly at the extensive margin rather than 
the intensive margin of products. As the 1980s approached, the output per hectare of 
certain major produce gradually expanded but at a slow rate, and in some cases was 
mostly stagnant in growth as shown in Table 4.2. This changed in the 1990s when a 
rapid increase in agricultural productivity occurred; with grains rising by 131% 
between 1990 and 2004 despite the land area for cultivation expanding by a mere 
16.1% (Baer and Filizzola 2005:5). A comparison of land areas under cultivation per 
crop in 1961 and 1982, as shown in Table 4.2 b), indicates that there has not been 
significant increases in the land areas under cultivation. However, the change in area 
utilized from 1982 to 2003 is substantial in most cases; owing largely to the 
agricultural boom in the 1990s. The effects of the boom are evident in the measures 
of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) which experienced an average growth rate of 3.3% 
when measured during the period from 1975 to 2002 (Baer and Filizzola 2005:8). 
 
However, if one were to consider the period of the 1990s and early 2000s the 
average growth rate of TFP was 4.88% and 6.04% respectively, indicating that the 
greater portion of positive growth in TFP was contributed by the latter years. It was 
found that much of the growth in TFP owed to increases in land productivity during 
this period (Baer and Filizzola 2005:8). Accompanying the growing success of the 
agricultural sector and agri-business industry, was a fast-growing need to address 
the issue of agrarian land concentration. The beneficiaries of the agri-business boom 
were few and far between while the masses of poor peasants remained dissatisfied 
with their lot in life. Pressure from various organisations began to mount, and so land 
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b) Agricultural Productivity in Brazil, 1961-2003(Hg/Ha) 
  
Source: Baer and Filizzola (2005) 
 
During the period of the 1990s the Brazilian government began its implementation of 
‘market-assisted’ land reforms as a means to help alleviate poverty in poor regions of 
the country; reforms which were largely financed by loans from the World Bank 
(Pereira 2007:23). The World Bank has been the primary promoter of the ‘market-
assisted’ approach to land reform in several developing countries. According to 
Fernandes et al. (2012:42), the World Bank finances ‘market-led’ agrarian reforms 
through various programmes including the “Land Bank, Combat Rural Poverty, and 
Family Farm Consolidation credit lines”. It is believed that the ‘market approach’ 
would have a less detrimental effect on existing markets than would the alternate 
model of state-led land expropriation (Pereira 2007:23), due to the fact that the 
market approach uses the existing property market while state-led reforms would 

















bypass the market.  Prior to the introduction of the ‘market-led’ land reform strategy, 
state-led reforms took centre stage as the ‘go-to’ solution for land reform in Brazil. 
Present-day land reform is officially termed ‘market-assisted’, however many cases 
of state-led land reform are still performed depending on the circumstances.  
 
The ‘market-assisted’ approach is based upon the concept that there exists a ‘willing 
buyer’ and a ‘willing seller’ in order for a transaction to be initiated. The trade of land 
is partially funded by the state by way of a subsidy, which is considered an 
investment by the state “in socio-productive infrastructure” (Pereira 2007:28). 
Agrarian reforms sponsored entirely by the state can involve the settlement of twenty 
families, or even five hundred families, while reforms driven solely by the markets 
can often extend to only a single family (Fernandes et al 2012:42). This ‘single family’ 
result has swayed both social movement groups and scholars to oppose the 
completely market-driven approach to land reform, arguing that this type of reform 
reaches too few individuals. In addition, beneficiaries tend to experience a lack of 
pre-reform and post-reform support and limited information, leading to undesirable 
results (Fernandes et al. 2012:42). Nevertheless, variations of the ‘market-assisted’ 
approach to agrarian reform persists.  
 
The land reform programme in Brazil is designed to facilitate the productivity of the 
land in that it provides higher investments to those who require lower loans to 
purchase the land. In general, the ‘willing seller’ would be paid the market price of the 
land; while the ‘willing buyer’ could be an individual or a “communal association” 
(Pereira 2007:28). This system has allowed for thousands of small-scale farmers to 
benefit from the agrarian reforms (Fernandes et al. 2012); but even so the system 
has been plagued with several problems and difficulties.  
 
The method of land reform adopted by the Brazilian government involves several 
actions. Local financial institutions act as a ‘middle-man’ between the state and the 
farmers by issuing subsidized loans to the farmers. Fernandes et al (2012:42) 
describe the initial stages of the process in three steps as follows; “the state finds 
land, rural labour unions filter candidates, local banks provide loans”.  Unfortunately, 
this results in the new farmer being weighed down by debt before the land has been 
made productive, which indicates that this system of reforming land lacks the 
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economic and political content that land reform policy should possess for it to fulfil its 
role of poverty alleviation. With the burden of debt being significantly greater than the 
resources held by the new farmer, there then exists an insufficiency in the farmer’s 
capacity to repay the loan that was initially granted by the local bank (Fernandes et al 
2012:42). Thus, the primary aim of the reform programme to enable the farmer to 
become a land owner is rarely fully realized.  
 
A land reform programme initiated in 1997, Cédula da Terra (PCT), assisted 15 255 
families over a five year period, incurring an accumulative cost of nearly R$ 100 
million, where R$ denotes the ‘Brazilian Real’ which is the currency used in Brazil. 
This programme went on to settle a further 62 990 families up to the end of 2008 
(Buainain et al.  2011:11). The reform programme used the market approach and 
required landless farmers to formally apply for land, while loans for land purchases 
were made available to successful applicants. It was found that several problems met 
the new landowners upon completion of land transfer; including issues related to 
credit access, technical assistance and education. Buainain et al (2011:27) suggest 
that policy should be adjusted to improve on aspects of increased provision of credit, 
technical assistance, and education for long-term maintenance of the land, market 
accessibility and new agricultural production techniques.  
 
Another study by Fernandes et al. (2012:42) refers to research which was 
incorporated into a paper by Ramos Filho (2009). The study included interviews that 
were performed with approximately 1500 beneficiaries spread across thirteen states 
in Brazil. It was found that most of the beneficiaries who were interviewed were not 
made to understand and grasp the terms under which they were granted loans, and 
did not possess a copy of the purchase agreement for the land which was transferred 
to them. A staggering 40% had not even received any form of technical assistance 
from the state to bring the land to full productive capacity; and with production levels 
being insufficient many beneficiaries defaulted on loan repayments which resulted in 
19% of these residents abandoning their land. This is a clear indication that although 
the land reform programme was intended to impact the beneficiaries’ lives positively, 
it may have actually worsened the financial position of many, and most likely 




The boom that occurred in the 1990s within the agri-business sector is believed to be 
as a result of trade liberalisation policies that were introduced during this period. 
Carter (2010:190) describes the resultant system as “the formation of a powerful 
triple alliance of the national landed elite, the state, and global agro-food 
corporations”. Land reform efforts to weaken the power held by large landowners 
have consistently been thwarted, as they continue to hold political and economic 
influence. It appears that this elite within society has resisted land reform 
programmes as well as any other plans to assist the poor and improve their rights 
(Carter 2010:190). The inequality between rich and poor can be seen clearly in 
political representation. During the period from 1995 to 2005 landless peasants were 
represented by one federal deputy for every 612 000 families, whereas the large 
landowners were represented by one federal deputy for every 236 families (Carter 
2010:191). This incredibly large inequality (representation of the large landowners 
was about 2587 times greater) resulted in large landowners having access to $1587 
(US dollars) from the public treasury for each single dollar made available to a 
peasant family (Carter 2010:191).  
 
Consideration for the sectoral distribution of the labour force in Brazil shows that the 
share of the labour force in the agricultural sector has been declining substantially 
over time (Table 4.3). According to Baer and Filizzola (2005:10) this decline is 
evidence of the relative inefficiency of the rural labour force. The distribution of rural 
land and income has remained very concentrated despite the efforts made to reform 
rural land. The magnitude of the disproportion in land concentration is reflected in the 
figures in Table 4.4 a) and b) (Baer and Filizzola 2005:12). The concentration of the 
number of farm units that are less than 10 hectares in size has reduced over time, 
while the concentration of all other farm sizes has increased very slightly. Only a little 
over 1% of existing farm units are greater than 1000 hectares in size, evidence that 
land ownership of large areas are concentrated in the hands of very few. Almost half 
of the agrarian land in Brazil is concentrated within the category of farms greater than 
1000 hectares. This has remained somewhat steady between 1980 and 2000, 
indicating that any land reform implemented during this period did not significantly 





Table 4.3   
Sectoral Distribution of the Labour Force in Brazil (%) 
 Agriculture Industry Services  Total 
1939 65.9 10.4 23.7 100.0 
1969 45.1 17.9 37.0 100.0 
1995 22.8 21.0 56.2 100.0 
2003 23.0 24.0 53.0 100.0 
Source: Baer and Filizzola (2005) 
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Source: Baer and Filizzola (2005) 
 












It is evident that despite the significant growth in the agribusiness sector there has 
not been any significant movement of the distribution of income toward a more 
equitable position. Although the agricultural production sector generates more jobs 
than the agribusiness industry, according to data presented by Baer and Filizzola 
(2005:15), the average income of a worker in the agricultural production sector is far 
lower than the average income of a worker in the agribusiness sector (Table 4.5). 
Furthermore, in 2002 the average income of a worker in the agricultural sector (R$ 
800.06) was substantially lower than the average income of a worker at a national 
level (R$ 5934.66). It is important to note that these 2002 averages include both 
employee and employer statistics, therefore the average of the working class 
peasant population alone would be much lower. According to Brazil’s Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE) more recent data (2010 census figures using 2014 
exchange rate) estimates the national average monthly salary for the average 
peasant worker at R$ 1643.14, while the richest 1% of the population earn an 
average of R$ 22 652.53 per month, evidence of a significantly large income gap. 
Baer and Filizzola (2005:27) found that overall, the distribution of income did not 
improve through land reform due to the fact that basic agricultural production 
(excluding agribusiness sectors) contributes a very small percentage to the country’s 
GDP. Hence, land reform may not be the best solution in addressing the issue of 
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5, 265, 800 4,018.28 
Source: Baer and Filizzola (2005) 
 
The Gini coefficient reveals a high concentration of income in Brazil. Bulmer-Thomas 
(2003:11) showed that in 2000 Brazil had the most unequal distribution of income in 
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Latin America, with almost half of the national income accruing to only 10% of the 
population. Lambais (2008:4) uses data from the National Institute for Colonization 
and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of 
the United Nations in the construction of Figure 4.1 (see Appendix) which shows Gini 
coefficients for several countries including Brazil. This data is not commensurate with 
the Gini coefficients estimated by the World Bank that estimated the Gini coefficient 
to be 0.64 in 2000, compared to the 0.8 estimated by INCRA and FAO in 2000. 
Nevertheless, all estimates indicate that the distribution of income is very 
concentrated and unequal in Brazil. According to the World Bank, the Gini coefficient 
was measured at 0.54 in 2009. Improvement by a small margin in 2010 was recorded 
by the World Bank when the Gini coefficient was measured at 0.53. However, this is 
still viewed as a high level of income inequality.   
 
Table 4.6 shows that up until 1994 a high Gini coefficient could be found in areas that 
benefitted from the land reform because these were not nearly efficient enough. A 
mere 176 033 families were resettled across 21 million hectares of arable area (Baer 
and Filizzola 2005:18). Although this reform process was hastened during Cardoso’s 
reign in office - a further 423 000 families were resettled over 22 million hectares of 
agrarian land - by the end of 2002 only 7.2% of the total agrarian land in Brazil had 
been reallocated.  
 
When President Lula took office in 2003, an adjusted land reform plan was initiated 
which aimed to resettle 530 000 families within three years. Alas, this goal was not 
met due to a lack of funding and a number of bureaucratic delays, and only 36 301 
families were reached by the programme (Baer and Filizzola 2005). Nevertheless, it 
would be incorrect not to acknowledge that progress has most certainly been made, 
however the MST believe that greater efforts are required to make a more significant 
difference; even going as far as to question the authenticity of the official numbers of 
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It has been argued by the MST that “…the continuing poor distribution of land is due 
to liberalization policies that favor large-scale, technologically advanced, export 
oriented agriculture rather than small farmers growing for local markets” (Baer and 
Filizzola 2005:24).  Other major concerns raised by the MST were that even after the 
resettlement of families was completed there had been no support provided to assist 
the families with the technical aspects involved in bringing the land to efficient use. 
The lack of training provided to the new land recipients results in the maintenance of 
the productivity of the land being very difficult and often results in a lost cause. The 
families are then forced into selling the land due to the inability to maintain the land 
and the inability to repay their debts (Baer and Filizzola 2005:20). Although the 
absolute count of the completed cases of land reform are impressive, compared to 
sixteen other Latin American countries that have implemented land reform, Brazil 
ranks last with regard to the percentage of families that have benefited from such 
programmes (Carter 2010:191). It appears that government is hesitant to take any 
drastic measures to equalize the distribution of land so as not to upset the 
agricultural and rural forces that be, resulting in land reform programmes having little 
to no real impact on land ownership patterns in the country (Carter 2010:192). 
 
 
The modernisation of the agribusiness sector and liberalisation policies boosted 
agricultural productivity and the pockets of big landowners. The agricultural annual 
growth rate was a healthy 5.4% between 1999 and 2003. This resulted in Brazil 
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becoming the second largest global producer of soybeans, the third largest corn 
producer, and the global leader in sugar and coffee production. In addition, the craze 
of cattle farming had hoisted Brazil into becoming one of the world’s major producers 
of beef and leather products; not to mention the growing participation in cotton 
production and bio-fuel innovations (Baer and Filizzola 2005:9). A country that has 
made advancements of such great magnitudes would be expected to be able to 
provide for the majority of its population; yet its masses are still living in desperate 
poverty.  
 
One may take this analysis further by comparing this outcome to that of Switzerland 
and Netherlands, two countries that have not had any land reform initiatives. 
Switzerland’s agricultural sector comprises primarily of small-scale farming due to 
government regulations which encourage self-sufficiency and restrictions on 
agricultural imports. Despite the small-scale farming system, Switzerland has been 
able to successfully operate a highly productive and efficient agricultural sector with 
quality produce. This has been achieved through the imposition of strict trading 
policies and the use of highly skilled and knowledgeable farmers, entrepreneurs and 
labour. On the other hand, the Netherlands has developed the agricultural sector 
adopting larger scale models of farming and producing at high levels for export. The 
Netherlands is currently the second highest exporter of agricultural produce in the 
world. This is phenomenal performance for a country with an area of 41 528 km², 
when compared to Brazil which is 8.516 million km². This is an indication that the size 
of a country and the amount of land available is not necessarily the determinant of 
the agricultural productivity of a country. The skill-level of the farming population, 
education and training, technology and farming methods used are integral to 
achieving success. Where there is a major shortage of both skilled labour and a 
culture of entrepreneurship, so too will there be under-production and inefficiency in 
the use of the land.  
 
The Lula government (up to 2010) failed to maintain the land redistributions at the 
level that was carried out by the Cardoso government, mostly due to the conservative 
approach taken toward policy implementation. This conservative approach was 
adopted in order to avoid putting a spanner in the works of the agribusiness industry. 
According to Carter (2010:197) the Lula government aimed at the promotion of 
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currency flows from agricultural exports by increasing the support provided to 
agribusiness farms. Between 2003 and 2007 the government’s support for the elite 
landowners and agribusiness participants was seven times greater than the support 
provided to peasant farmers, despite the fact that the rural labour force is comprised 
87% of peasants (Carter 2010:197). According to Alston and Mueller (2010:28) the 
mass voters appear to prefer land reform policies which aim to redistribute land 
(rather than other forms of reform) because of the high levels of inequality. The 
indirect consequences of this preference are that landless peasants are left 
unemployed and cases of land conflicts rise.   
 
Unfortunately, there is little to no academic research available on the land reform 
activities in Brazil since the start of the Rousseff presidency in 2011. However, 
news/media articles and reports have shed some light as to the direction it has taken 
in recent years. The Latin American Herald Tribune reported in 2012 that nothing had 
been done by the Rousseff presidency with regard to land reform; including 
allegations that the government had reduced the investments to be made in land 
expropriations. According to a report in Equal Times, 2013 saw virtually no progress 
made by land reform programmes in Brazil. John Paul Rodrigues, a coordinating 
member of MST, expressed immense disappointment, stating that only 159 families 
were resettled during 2013. It is believed that this shockingly poor result is due to the 
dominance of agribusiness forces within the National Congress who have the power 
to sway policies in favour of their objectives, while neglecting those of the masses. 
These media statistics and reports cannot be verified in terms of quality and reliability 
(such as those offered in academia), however it does give the reader an idea of the 
increasing dissatisfaction of the rural poor in Brazil. 
 
Lambais et al. (2013:45) find that for land reform to be successful the “initial access 
to technical assistance, credit, and good resource endowments, group cooperation 
with collective labour” are integral factors. Households become technically efficient 
when agricultural production is more market-orientated and the use of resources is 
more intensive. According to leading peasant movement organisations (such as MST 
and Via Campesina) agrarian reform policy must meet certain criteria moving 
forward. Recommendations made for the purpose of policy changes involve 
improvements in infrastructure, transportation, education and health. Additionally, 
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policy should be drawn up in a manner that considers the provision of subsidised 
credit which favours and serves to protect peasants. Technical assistance should be 
made available free of charge to new land owners, and new farmers should receive 
adequate support in entering the agri-business industry with freer access to the 
markets. Further suggestions from Pereira (2007:24) offer areas for consideration 
which are laid out as follows: 
 
 
            “…the agrarian reform debate must incorporate discussions on topics related to the 
growing tendency for privatization of natural resources such as food sovereignty, free 
access to seeds and agro-ecology, and the concentration, centralization and 
financing of intensive capital in the agricultural system.” 
 
The situation at hand is something of a predicament. The agricultural sector is 
healthy and growing steadily, however this has not been beneficial to all Brazilians 
because profits accrue to the few wealthy landowners. In the meantime pressure for 
land reform is growing and for good reason; far too large a portion of the population 



















Chapter 5    South Africa 
 
 
5.1 Background to the South African Case  
South African land tenure has been shaped by numerous events and influences. 
There exists a rich history of state regulation, land dispossession, struggle and 
rebellion attached to present-day regimes. The colonial period followed by the racial 
oppression of Apartheid, have led to white settlers and their families taking 
possession of and inheriting the majority of the land in South Africa. "African 
‘reserves’ were created as a way to contain resistance and to facilitate the supply of 
cheap labour for the emerging capitalist economy” (Cousins 2007:283). Black South 
Africans were not permitted to own land outside of the ‘reserves’ which diminished 
their agricultural abilities and access to land. According to Hall (2004:33), 
“Agricultural capital has long been a white preserve in South Africa, and a crucially 
important political constituency for successive Apartheid governments”.  
 
Many years prior to the formation of the Bantu people and long before the first 
Western interventions, South Africa belonged solely to the native African San people. 
The aboriginal people known as the KoeSan or San people are the primary tribe to 
whom the country first belonged, thereafter other tribes and indigenous groups were 
formed. The Koe (sheep and cattle pastoralists) and San (hunter-gatherers) tribes, as 
well as all Bantu-speaking people are considered to be the indigenous people of 
South Africa (ILO 1999). The term Bantu-speaking refers to people who speak any of 
a set of languages that are native to Southern Africa, such as Zulu; Ndebele; Sotho 
and Xhosa (among others). It is important to first understand how land was treated 
and used by the indigenous people, in order to appreciate the full effect of and some 
of the reasons behind the reform failures in recent times.  
 
Communal ownership of land supported the livelihood activities of hunter-gatherers 
and pastoralists; the basis upon which indigenous people thrived. These tribes lack 
formal institutions; the institutions present are mainly the family unit and leadership 
from traditional healers or chiefs (ILO 1999). The subsistence economy dominated; 
there existed no Western notions of trade, exchange or bartering. Land was 
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abundant and the population was small, meaning that since land was communal and 
belonged to all, people were free to do as they pleased. Tribes could graze, hunt and 
relocate at will to any available land they found. This is the foundation upon which the 
major challenges of land reform are resting today. The land wastage that occurs 
once land is reformed is linked to the fact that while the indigenous tribes receive the 
land that is rightfully theirs, land itself is no longer abundant and people are no longer 
few. Communal ownership and the subsistence economy are no longer a practical or 
productive way of life, while it is not accommodated for in Western economic 
structures and institutions. 
 
Colonialism has historically affected many African countries, and there are important 
lessons to be learnt for the young democracy that exists in South Africa. An integral 
influence on South Africa’s land history has to do with the associated events in 
Zimbabwe. Colonialism in Zimbabwe had similar effects to South Africa, as the 
majority of the land was forcefully claimed by white settlers. The magnitude of the 
problem within each country is somewhat different, as well as the methods 
implemented to correct the issues. Atuahene (2011) provide reasons behind the 
greater land revolt that was experienced in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2011. 
According to Atuahene (2011: 122) “only about three percent of South Africa’s GDP 
is based on agriculture, whereas before the 2000 land grabs in Zimbabwe, 
agriculture contributed about 20 percent of that country’s GDP”.  A vast portion of the 
Zimbabwean population depend on the land for their livelihoods from an economic 
perspective. This differs to South Africa in that agriculture contributes only a small 
amount toward GDP, while over a third of the South African population actually 
reside in rural areas and thus require the land for survival.  
 
The hunger of the Zimbabwean people and of Robert Mugabe’s ruling party (ZANU-
PF) to ‘take back the land’ from white owners spurred a major revolt within the 
country and led to mass confiscations of land from the white famers. Many wonder if 
South Africa will, at some point in time, follow in these footsteps. However the lesson 
South Africa needs to take away from the Zimbabwean experience is one of utmost 
importance: Zimbabwe’s economy crashed and instability in its currency drowned the 
country in a hyperinflation crisis which peaked in 2008 at a monthly rate of 79.6 
billion percent (Hanke and Kwok 2009). Soon after, the use of the local currency 
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ceased and currencies from other countries began to exchange hands (Hanke and 
Kwok 2009). What would become of South Africa should it also begin radical land 
reforms such as Zimbabwe? The consequences ought to be carefully considered 
before action is taken. Even so, the issue of inequality still remains and must be 
addressed for there to be any justice served to the native people of South Africa. 
 
The South African history of land rights can be traced back to the pre-colonial period 
through to the era of colonization, followed by the Apartheid era. These three periods 
form the historical background for the post-Apartheid and modern-day tenure 
regimes. 
 
During the pre-colonial era land was abundant and resource exploitation was 
extensive. The traditional economy was strong within the indigenous communities. 
African men usually engaged in activities associated with living a semi-nomadic way 
of life (Houbart Houghton 1953:350). The ownership of cattle was a major economic 
and a social influencing factor; while crop farming played only a small role (Houbart 
Houghton 1953:350). Although land was necessary for the survival of the people, this 
demand did not exact an exchange value (or market price). The rights to land were 
vested in communities that were run by elders and chiefs. As long as an individual 
was a member of that particular community, that individual had rights to access the 
land (Cousins 2007). In most parts of the country there existed various means 
through which one could acquire land; through formal transfer, marriage, and even 
migration. One could request land from one’s parents; or from another relative or 
friend. An alternate route was to apply to the headman or chief. Tenure security was 
guaranteed under the conditions that members respected the ethical code of the 
community (tribe), and effectively used and maintained the land they were granted 
(Cousins 2007). Common practice of some tribes was to claim land, use it to the 
point of depletion and then to move on to new land. This often accompanied inter-
tribal wars where one tribe would have to fight off a weaker tribe in order to claim the 
land (Houbart Houghton 1953:351). Land that was successfully claimed was often 
shared by large families; where each member had a right to use the land, and men 
and women had equal eligibility in the claim of land. A key feature of the communal 
land system was that the access to and the use of scarce resources were shared by 
all. The regulation of common property was the responsibility of the higher authorities 
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in the tribes. This tenure system was common among a number of South African 
tribes, such as:  Tswana, Sotho, Pedi, Zulu, Pondo, Lobedu, and Venda (Cousins 
2007:295). 
 
The colonization of South Africa (by the Dutch and then by the British) impacted on 
the ownership and use of land. The increased population and demand for agricultural 
development to support the newly formed western markets led to the increased 
scarcity of land. Laws were passed that ordered the resettlement of indigenous 
groups on a large scale; disrupting the communal systems of the tribes. There was a 
growing feeling of insecurity, and hostility toward the foreigners had increased. 
 
During the period of British rule the country was split into four regions governed by 
different political entities, these were: the Cape Colony; Transvaal Colony; Natal 
Colony and Orange River Colony. The Native Locations and Commonage Act of 
1879 passed by the Cape Colony allocated specific areas for black South Africans, 
where the rights to land ownership were reduced in their capacity. However, this Act 
was not received well and a new act – the Glen Grey Act of 1894 – was passed.  
This new act was designed to increase the supply of migrant workers to the mines. 
Even this was not embraced by the tribes, with one of the restrictions being that a 
married man was not allowed to own more than one plot of land; thus tenure security 
remained low.  
 
After 1881, black South Africans in many parts of South Africa were no longer 
allowed to hold land in their personal right and under their own names, in addition to 
this they were confined to ‘reserves’ (Cousins 2007). The aim of the foreign settlers 
was to reduce African ownership and increase their own, which resulted in 
resentment and conflict. The new form of livelihood for Africans was income via wage 
labour, which suited the desire that the foreigners had for growth of the capitalist 
economy. Thus, the traditional communal land tenure system was broken; gender 
ownership was skewed; the traditional family unit collapsed with the introduction of 
the western economy and industrialization; and an imbalance of power prevailed.  
 
The Apartheid Era began in 1948, some years after the close of colonialism. The 
South African Union party was established between the British and the Afrikaners 
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(South African Dutch descendents) in order to gain independence from the British 
colony, however it was only when the National Party came into power in 1948 that 
South Africa gained full independence from the Crown. The transition period between 
the two eras brought with it the 1913 Native Land Act which limited the reserves to a 
mere 7% of the land in the country (Cousins 2007). Another 6% of land area was 
added to this through the 1936 Land and Trust Act (Cousins 2007). A number of 
regulations were introduced leading to a further reduction in tenure security. Black 
South Africans who laid land claims were denied and farming via land rental was 
disallowed (Feinstein 2005). Black South Africans were forced into working in the 
mines, providing cheap labour for the European-owned mining companies.  
 
However, the country underwent industrialization from 1924 onwards (Feinstein 
2005), to reduce the dependence of the economy on mining. Thus, labour was 
directed toward the farms and the agricultural economy grew, once again favouring 
white South Africans who owned the vast areas of commercial farmland.  Racial 
discrimination governed laws, giving white residents the upper hand. Black South 
Africans resorted to revolt and upheaval in response to the racist laws. According to 
Cousins (2007), the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 played a key role in rural rebellion 
movements. It forced upon the tribes, an authoritarian rule by chiefs who reported to 
the state and who were incentivised to increase their own lot. In addition, plot size 
was restricted and female rights to land fell away. The changes in land tenure worked 
to induce cheap labour policies, and the “cost-effective control of rural populations” 
(Cousins 2007:302), while promoting racial discrimination and oppression of black 
South Africans.  
 
Due to the large-scale dispossession that has occurred over time, South African 
reform policy for the post-Apartheid era focuses on both redistribution and restitution. 
 Three types of land reform to be implemented in South Africa were set out in the 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997: 
 
1) Land Redistribution 
Programme that assists poor and previously disadvantaged groups/individuals 
to buy land and thus become land owners. This is usually directed at 
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addressing the racial imbalance of land ownership in the country. 
 
2) Land Restitution 
Allows for land or some form of compensation to be returned to the original 
landowners who lost their land as of 19 June 1913 when racially discriminatory 
laws were passed. 
 
3) Land Tenure Reform 
A type of land reform that “aims to bring all people occupying land under a 
unitary, legally validated system of landholding. It will devise secure forms of 
land tenure, help resolve tenure disputes and provide alternatives for people 
who are displaced in the process” (White Paper 1997:9). 
 
 
A ‘market-assisted’ (Hall 2004) approach is taken toward addressing issues of 
inequality and tenure security in an attempt to ‘right’ the wrongs of the past. The 1997 
White Paper on South African Land Policy provides the policy framework for land 
reform in South Africa (Lahiff 2007:1579). Lahiff (2007:1580) quotes the objective of 
the policy from the 1997 White Paper: 
 
“The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access 
to land for residential and productive uses, in order to improve their income and 
quality of life. The programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, 
women, as well as emergent farmers. Redistributive land reform will be largely based 
on willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements. Government will assist in the purchase of 
land, but will in general not be the buyer or owner. (White Paper 1997)” 
 
The intention is to implement the policy by means of a redistribution programme that 
benefits as many people within the target groups as possible. Specific details on the 
programme are found in several policy documents that can be altered and expanded 
as required (Lahiff 2007:1580). Hence, the aim of the land reform programme is 
essentially to assist in uplifting the poor by providing land and income security. This 
should be achieved while also considering the existing agricultural sector of the 
economy. In order to establish just how successful (or not) the programme has been 
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one must study both the direct aims and outcomes of the programme, as well as the 
by-products affecting the existing markets and economy as a whole. An effective 
programme should be effective in achieving its objectives, while also ensuring that 
there are no secondary compromises or losses to all markets involved and affected 
that lead to inefficiencies and wastage. The questions to be investigated are:  
1) Is the land reform programme achieving the objectives set out? 
2) What affect is the programme having on the Agricultural sector and the 
economy of South Africa? 
 
The concept mentioned in the abstract above; “willing-buyer willing seller”, is what is 
referred to as the market-assisted approach to land reform. This process changed 
the non-market approach to land reform by introducing market mechanisms (Lahiff 
2007:1580). The decision to adopt this specific approach is aligned with the 
“neoliberal macroeconomic strategy” of the African National Congress (ANC - South 
Africa’s first democratically elected government), in the hope of encouraging and 
building a more investor friendly environment within South African financial markets 
(Lahiff 2007:1580). The process of reforming land is ‘demand led’, meaning that 
government does not participate in any prior purchase or expropriation of land for 
subsequent resettlement, rather the programme requires that members of the public 
make a claim in order to initiate the process (Adams and Howell 2001:6).  
 
The programme proved to be effective on several accounts, but there are still many 
problems and criticisms. According to Lahiff (2007:1580) the system has been 
criticized for transferring what was previously commercial farmland to poor people 
who do not have the necessary skills and capital to continue with production to serve 
the agricultural market, thus the land is run down and misused to the detriment of the 
agricultural sector. Other problems that have arisen include the cost of transacting 
being far too high; inadequate infrastructure on a provincial level; and an insufficient 
reform grant to the land claimants which encourages the formation of deficient 
groups of people in order to attain the required funds (equivalent to the asking price) 
to purchase the land (Adams and Howell 2001:6). It was found that most of the 
redistribution cases have involved applicants who were individually unable to afford 
to purchase the land at the asking price, therefore a group of applicants pool their 
resources in order to purchase the commercial farmland that is owned by white 
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farmers (Lahiff 2007:1581). This outcome highlights the large discrepancies in the 
grants provided by the state to assist applicants in making their purchases and the 
actual cost of the agricultural land; begging the question of whether or not the initial 
plan for reform is realistic.  
 
Another criticism of the programme is that it is “perpetuating highly unequal relations 
between white owner-managers and black worker-shareholders, and for providing 
little by means of material benefits to workers” (Lahiff 2007:1581). There are various 
successes and failures linked to the reform policy being implemented in South Africa; 
a further analysis of which is presented in 5.2 of this chapter. 
 
The market-assisted approach that has been adopted in South African policy has 
also been adopted elsewhere in the world, as well as in Brazil, however the South 
African version of this approach differs slightly. Lahiff (2007:1582) describes the 
South African land reform programme as an “outcome of competing imperatives and 
contending political forces”, rather than a single policy that outlines the programme in 
entirety. The issue of land reform was not raised as an issue of utmost importance as 
it contends with issues such as HIV/AIDS; where greater discourse, efforts and funds 
have been directed (Lahiff 2007:1583). This matter itself is contested within 
government where some political forces believe land reform should be pushed to the 
forefront. The pieces that make up the land reform programme seem detached and 
present a haphazard policy on the whole, making the process very slow and unable 
to meet its primary goals (Lahiff 2007:1583). A discussion of the impacts of the 
implemented land reform programmes in South Africa follows. 
 
 
5.2 Impact in South Africa  
The dawn of democracy in South Africa brought with it a new perspective to land 
reform in the country. According to an account by Hirsch (2005) the first democratic 
government under Mandela and Mbeki were not strongly focused on land reform, 
while other issues took priority. There was very little effort expended on the issue of 
redistribution of land and expectations were low as the amount of arable land in 
South Africa is limited with much of the inland areas comprising of desert. 
Additionally it is also mentioned in the MERG (1993) Report that it was unclear at the 
42 
 
time as to whether the ANC party was committed to a solid programme that would 
provide the rural poor with access to land for production and residential purposes. 
This lack of clarity is an indication in itself that the ANC had not yet planned for any 
major land redistribution. It is only during more recent times, years after the first 
democratic government was elected, that the issue of land reform has been more 
aggressively debated. The influence of the first democratic government which was an 
economically conservative government and support from the World Bank led to the 
implementation of the conservative market-led approach to agrarian reform. 
 
South African land reform policy has come to rely heavily on the market, with very 
little intervention from the state. The need for land reform arose because, by 1994 
(the end of Apartheid), approximately 82 million hectares of agricultural land 
belonged to white people; this amounted to 10.9% of the population owning 68% of 
the total area of land in the country (Lahiff 2007:1578). Black South Africans lived in 
poor conditions in the homelands where overcrowding and tenure insecurity were the 
norm. According to Lahiff (2007:1578), South Africa has one of the most unequal 
distributions of income in the world. Although South Africa had achieved democracy, 
the majority of the economic power and wealth remained in the hands of the few 
white people in the country. “Political apartheid may have ended, but economic 
apartheid lives on.” (Atuahene 2011:121).  
 
The agricultural industry in South Africa is characterised by a large-scale commercial 
sector and communal lands with small-scale farmers (Lahiff 2007:1578). Although 
82% of the total surface area can be used for agricultural purposes, low rainfall in 
many parts of the country makes the land more suitable for grazing (Lahiff 
2007:1578). This resulting scarcity of suitable land for crop farming, as well as a 
commercial sector that is dominated by white farmers producing fruit and meat 
products for exportation, greatly influences agrarian reform in South Africa. The 
commercial sector contributes significantly to the economy via increased employment 
and earnings from exports, which is one of the primary reasons for the limited state 
intervention in reforming land in a way that would eventually harm the economy. It 
appears that a major challenge facing the South African government is how to best 
address and remedy the issues of past injustices, and alleviating poverty in rural 
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areas without upsetting and destroying the well-developed agricultural sector of the 
economy.  
 
Communal land is a prominent characteristic of rural South Africa. Apartheid affected 
communities in a detrimental way. In recent times it has been questioned as to 
whether communal ownership of land should exist at all (Kahn 2007:16). Historically, 
and culturally, the communal way of life has been dominant in Africa; however the 
issue of whether this fits into society today has been raised. By introducing the 
western titling system, colonialism abolished the majority of the communal lands that 
existed in South Africa. A unique challenge that South Africa faces in its land reform 
efforts is the cultural wall of traditions of the tribes that still exist in rural South Africa. 
According to the ILO Report on South Africa (‘Indigenous peoples of South Africa: 
Current trends’) “the root cause hindering economic development and 
intergenerational cultural survival has been the forced dispossession of traditional 
land that once formed the basis of hunter-gatherer and pastoralist economies and 
identities” (ILO 1999:13). The effects of the dispossession of tribes from their lands 
have made natural resources inaccessible and thus pushed them into a state of 
poverty as they can no longer take care of themselves. The traditional tribal 
communities who wish to preserve their ancient way of life now have the right to 
claim back their lands. These lands that were agriculturally and economically 
productive are now returning to their original role of providing grounds for the hunter-
gatherer communities who do not wish to run commercial farms nor to join the 
modern economy of the country. This has contributed toward the slowly diminishing 
agricultural sector of the economy seen today. It appears that the traditional 
subsistence economy does not align well with western economic practices and hence 
is not suitable for supporting and growing the agricultural sector. Solutions on 
combining economic development with cultural survival are crucial. Hence, 
government is faced with a further challenge of trying to converge both traditional and 
western systems of land ownership in a way that does not cause revolt. 
  
Up until 2000 South Africa’s main land reform policy was the ‘Settlement/Land 
Acquisition Grant’ (SLAG). The programme was somewhat successful in reaching 
the rural poor, however progress was slow and the majority of the recipients did not 
have the necessary skills to maintain the land which they received (Lahiff 
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2007:1580). During the first five years of the implementation of land reform the focus 
of the programme was to reach the poorest of the rural populous. One of the criteria 
for qualifying applicants was that households had to have an income of less than 
R1500.00 per month (Sibanda 2001:7). A ‘Quality of Life Report’ was submitted in 
1999 which claimed that the programme had successfully reached the rural poor; that 
agricultural production was taking place; and the beneficiaries of the programme had 
increased access to services as a result (Sibanda 2001:7). Unfortunately, the level of 
poverty in the country remained high, and although the programme positively 
impacted on the beneficiaries it had reached only a few households. Thus, the SLAG 
programme was removed and replaced by the ‘Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development’ (LRAD) in 2001. The new programme offers more loan financing and 
higher grants than SLAG, and incorporates the promotion of commercial farming. 
Hopes for the new programme were high and goals were ambitious to say the least.  
  
Unfortunately results from the LRAD have not been much better, indicating that land 
reform in South Africa has not met set goals nor has it achieved its targets within the 
proposed time period. The initial target set was for 30% of commercial farmland to be 
redistributed to poor black farmers within a five year time period; however when the 
reality of the slow progress that had been made became evident the time period was 
then extended to 20 years. The set target of 30% of land to be reformed constitutes 
about 24.6 million hectares in totality (Walker 2001:16); which is to be redistributed 
over 20 years.  








































Source: Hall (2004) 
 
Land transfers declined from 2001 to 2002 possibly due to a change in land reform 
policy from SLAG to LRAD. The rate of land reform was far too slow; if the revised 
target of 30% was to be reached by 2015 there would have to have been 2.15 million 
hectares of land transferred each year – which was clearly unrealistic when 
considering the rate of transfer at the time (Hall 2004:25). With regards to the impact 
of LRAD, Hall (2004:26) found that it was not possible to draw exact conclusions 
using the data due to the unreliable nature of record-keeping. Lahiff (2007:1581) 
estimated that even a 20 year period would not have been sufficient because land 
reform remained slow despite the new policy (only 4.1% of land had been reformed 
by 2006).  
 
The commitment of government to reforming land should be visible in its attempts to 
increase budgets, staffing and support services. However, the planned budget for 
land reform between 2001 and 2003 actually declined; indicating a lack of 
commitment on the part of government (Walker 2001:16). This is reiterated by Kahn 
(2007:13) who points out that in 2005, only 1% of the national budget was allocated 
to land reform; indicating that this issue is not a high priority for the state. It was 





Consideration for the various forms of land reform in South Africa is given in Table 
5.1(Lahiff 2007:1582), where the market-led approach (which falls under 
‘Redistribution’) is partly responsible for the greatest area (43.8% of the total area 
transferred) of land reformed in the country up to 2006. Lahiff (2007:1582) 
emphasizes that measuring the exact magnitude of achievements is difficult and near 
impossible due to a lack of reporting detail by government offices and agents. 
According to Carter et al. (2011:4), a reason for the difficulty faced with the 
evaluation of the impact of the LRAD in South Africa is that it relies heavily on self-
selection. Thus, if the poorest of people do not voluntarily make efforts to enter the 
programme they will in effect stand no chance of gaining from it. Although, 
theoretically, a redistribution of assets should be beneficial to those who require it; 
empirical evidence to prove this has often been fraught with problems or been very 
limited. A reason for this is that most experiences of large-scale reforms arise as a 











Source: Lahiff (2007) – Data from The Department of Land Affairs 
 
 
Liberals, conservatives and even some government agents tend to not be in favour of 
any radical approach to land reform due to fear of the consequences that would be 
borne by the agricultural market and the economy. However, it is acknowledged that 
political stability can be achieved by creating a more inclusive environment within the 
agricultural sector which would allow black rural farmers to participate in the sector 




To throw a spanner in the works, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM)  - an 
organisation much like Brazil’s MST – was formed to speak up for the rights of the 
poor landless South Africans. LPM is affiliated to Via Campesina in Latin America; 
showing the growing support for the poor in developing nations. LPM is often found 
protesting around parliamentary buildings for what they believe government should 
be doing to help the landless in South Africa.  
 
The single most prominent problem with the South African reform programme is that, 
upon settlement, beneficiaries are expected to maintain the farms that belonged to 
the white farmers at a similar level (Lahiff 2007:1590). This has proved to be the 
greatest area of failure because the new farmers are often too poor and under-skilled 
to achieve former levels of production, thus land which was once productive and 
economically active becomes run-down and underutilized. The lack of post-
settlement support is very evident. Government encourages new farmers to seek 
funding from public and private organisations which does not always prove to be 
easy. According to Lahiff (2007:1590), various studies indicate that the new farmers 
encounter problems when attempting to access “credit, training, extension advice, 
transport and ploughing services, and veterinary services, as well as input and 
produce markets”. 
 
Some other primary issues relating to the land reform programme that have been 
isolated are the failure to subdivide large pieces of land, and the unrealistic business 
plans that are drawn up for the new landowners (Lahiff 2007:1588). The failure to 
subdivide the land forces new landowners to accept the responsibility for the 
maintenance and production of land which is too large, and for which they do not 
have the capacity to maintain. New land owners become greatly burdened as a 
result. The second issue of unrealistic business plans refers to the plans that are 
drawn up by state agents to assist new farmers in the development and production 
stages. These ideas seem beneficial, but when implemented fall short of meeting 
realistic requirements (Lahiff 2007:1588). Often the inability to obtain funding and 
loans renders the plan unusable by the new farmers. In some cases where loans are 
administered, new farmers default on their loan payments while banks threaten to 




According to Johnston and Sender (2004:157) statistics and estimates of the number 
of poor rural households in South Africa are usually unreliable. However in 2004 it 
was calculated that there were approximately 1 million rural households that were 
chronically poor (out of the 3.3 million rural households in the country). Thus, by 2004 
(ten years after democracy was established), the poorest of the poor still had not 
benefitted from the land reform programmes. Further evidence indicates that of those 
who did benefit from the programmes, the majority formed part of the wealthier rural 
households (Johnston and Sender 2004:157).  
 
Turning to the World Bank for evidence of poverty alleviation proved to be unhelpful. 
The bank did not have evidence on this account (Johnston and Sender 2004:158). 
No results had been reported with regard to the creation of employment on the new 
farms, making it unclear as to whether the change of ownership is contributing 
toward increasing wage employment opportunities (Johnston and Sender 2007:158). 
In addition, since 1994 when land reform began to take shape focusing on the rural 
poor as its target, existing wealthy landowners began shedding employees out of fear 
that they would lose control of their land, resulting in great losses to the rural wage 
earning sector (Johnston and Sender 2007:158). Overall Johnston and Sender 
conclude that “redistributive land reform in South Africa has had adverse effects on 
the standard of living of very large numbers of the poorest rural people”.  
 
Most rural black people find themselves still confined to the homelands due to a lack 
of alternate options. The homelands remain overcrowded and only a small portion of 
the land is suitable for agricultural production (Cousins and Lahiff 2005:128). 
According to previous literature, about 50% of rural households have access to 
arable land, however each individual holding is very small, ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 
hectares (Cousins and Lahiff 2005:128). It was found that many of the residents of 
these rural areas are wage-employed or receiving some form of a grant as income. 
While income from agricultural activities contributes to a small proportion of the total 
household income; it is a crucial part of household survival (Cousins and Lahiff 
2005:128). 
 The limited number of studies that have been conducted indicate that the proportion 
of poor landless people that are being reached by the programme are predominantly 
literate males over 40 years of age; and, increasingly, that they “are those with 
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access to wage income (including pensions), rather than the unemployed, and have 
relatively good access to information” (Lahiff 2007:1587). In addition, the nature of 
self-selection into the programme has resulted in the exclusion of the poorest and 
most marginalised groups. According to Cousins and Lahiff (2005:129), in general 
land reform has not changed the pattern of land ownership in South Africa, nor has it 
improved levels of poverty in the country. It appears that the combination of the 
market-based approach to land reform together with neoliberal policies is not the best 
way to achieve a significant asset shift toward the rural poor or to revive the rural 
economy (Cousins and Lahiff 2005:131). 
 
According to Atuahene (2011:121), by 2010 a total of 8% of the land had been 
reformed – still nowhere near the target of 30%. It was estimated in 2011 that an 
alarming 77% of land in the country was owned by white people, who make up less 
than 10% of the population (Atuahene 2011:127). President Zuma has made land 
reform and rural development one of the top priorities of the ANC, which he declared 
in a speech in 2011. However, this is yet to be seen. Funds have run low and the 
state has not been able to meet the sale agreements entered into with landowners 
(Atuahene 2011:123). Consequently, many landowners have sued the commission 
for not following through with the sales agreements (Atuahene 2011:124). This has 
created the notion that perhaps the ANC is not serious about land reform; hesitant to 
upset the ‘agricultural apple-cart’. It is possible that if the ANC were to adopt a more 
aggressive approach than the market-led policy, this would have detrimental effects 
on the markets and alienate investors. This fear has kept land reform policy 
conservative and slow.  
 
Furthermore, the government does not provide adequate support to new landowners 
post-transfer. New landowners are in dire need of “financial and technical support to 
access markets, credit, technology, infrastructure, and training” (Atuahene 
2011:125). Studies performed by the “Program for Land and Agrarian Studies at the 
University of the Western Cape” found that new landowners are not even provided 
with the basic utilities such as electricity and tools for irrigation (Atuahene 2011:125). 
Once again the issue of subdivision prevails. The state transfers large areas of land 
to newly settled owners who do not have the resources to effectively produce and 
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maintain the land; and so the agricultural sector suffers together with the new 
landowners who have to carry the burden of debt.   
 
Although South Africa has developed an advanced agricultural industry which relies 
heavily on the exportation of high-value goods (such as meat and fruit), agriculture is 
not a major contributor to the country’s GDP – about 4% of GDP according to Kahn 
(2007:2). Statistics published by the World Wildlife Federation (WWF–SA) indicate 
that in 2008 the contribution of agriculture to GDP was only 2.5%; showing a great 
decline. Figure 5.2 (Wittenberg 2014) is a depiction of the movement of labour 
productivity by sector based on gross value added per worker. Agricultural 
productivity rose before 1997, dropped thereafter and remained somewhat constant 
with little fluctuation until 2012.  
 
 However, both WWF-SA and Kahn (2007) highlight the importance of agriculture in 
providing employment and in enabling a channel for foreign exchange income. The 
agricultural sector accounts for approximately 10% of employment in the country 
(Kahn 2007:2). Thus, a blow to the agricultural sector could significantly impact 
employment levels in an adverse way. Government’s interest in upholding the 
agribusiness industry is warranted on this account, however this does not mean that 
the market-based approach is the best solution here.  
 
Post-Apartheid employment patterns and statistics shed some light on the distribution 
of employment and earnings among wage-workers in South Africa by race and 
sector.  Figure 5.3 shows that a large portion of the low-skilled wage workers in 
South Africa were employed within the agricultural sector, however this appears to 
have declined significantly since 1994. Wittenberg (2014) offers a possible reason for 
this in that perhaps the decline is not real but is likely to have arisen from skewed 
sampling. However other possibilities do exist as various factors influencing 
employment within agriculture changed during the Post-Apartheid years. The overall 
drop in agricultural productivity may very well have contributed toward a drop in 




Figure 5.2  
Labour Productivity Gross Value Added per Worker (Rands ‘000s/ worker) 
Source: Wittenberg, 2014. 
 
 
Figure 5.3    
Total Employment by Sector (Post-Apartheid)     
Source: Wittenberg, 2014. 
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According to Wittenburg (2014) real earnings by race in 1994 showed great 
discrepancies between white workers and native African workers, with white workers 
being at the top of the racial earnings scale and African workers at the bottom. The 
study revealed that this trend persisted over the succeeding years to 2012. Sectoral 
analysis showed that of the wage earners in the various sectors of the economy, 
workers in the agricultural sector appeared to have been among the lowest earnings 
on the sector-earnings scale. Wiitenberg (2014) found that the earnings of 
agricultural sector workers have increased since 1994, albeit minimally. What is 
interesting to note is the major decline in earnings of self-employed agricultural 
workers, which Wittenburg (2014) attributes to an overrepresentation of the white 
farmers from the formal farming sector in surveys conducted during the early years. It 
is difficult to isolate the real reason behind this drop, nevertheless it still stands that 
the gap between the earnings of white wage earners and native African wage 
earners is significant as seen in Figure 5.4. This fact provides reason enough for 
government to intervene; the method of intervention used by government is the 
primary issue at hand.  
 
Figure 5.4  
Real Earnings of Wage-Workers by Race 




The LRAD programme offered by government is thought to be attractive to 
landowners because it offers them payment in cash prices. However, many 
landowners who have engaged in the programme complain of delays in payment that 
can last up to 4 years (Lahiff 2007:1586). Another problem related to pricing is that 
price-setting tends to occur via bureaucratic procedures, and so the workings of the 
actual property market are excluded from the process; essentially abandoning the 
‘market-assisted’ orientation (Lahiff 2007:1586). The government’s reasoning for the 
adoption of the market-assisted approach to land reform is that the system ensures 
that efficiency is maintained and improved, while also maintaining investor 
confidence (Kahn 2007:9). However, according to the WWF-SA, these actions have 
cost the country as the number of farmers has actually declined by 31% from 1993 to 
2008; with the production of staples such as wheat, maize and dairy declining the 
most. This has resulted in increased food insecurity among the rural poor. The WWF-
SA also finds that not only has land reform to reach the poor been very slow, but it 
has had a failure rate of 90% and led to the reduction of certain produce (WWF 
2009:19).  
 
An example of a form of land redistribution is given by a Western Cape Farmer who 
provided land as an incentive for his workers to work harder and make his wine a 
success (Kahn 2007:26). When his wine was awarded for being the best wine in 
South Africa, he gifted his workers with 11 hectares of farmland for 16 families. The 
families pooled their resources to produce wine of their own that they could sell in the 
market. They had the necessary skills to do so; resulting in some success during the 
initial stages. However, they found that running their own farms and marketing 
themselves was too difficult. Breaking into the industry was also not easy. They 
eventually requested that the farmer reincorporate the land; they had failed to follow 
through with the initial plan (Kahn 2007:26).This serves as a very simplistic example 
of land reform (although performed privately). It shows that it is not enough to simply 
hand over land to the rural poor and expect them to live happily ever after without 
consideration for skills and capital requirements. 
 
The transfer of ownership of land from wealthy white farmers to poor rural black 
families does not suffice as land reform; reform should be accompanied by post-
settlement assistance involving assistance to access funding to run farming activities 
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and to maintain the land at an acceptable level of productivity – however this proves 
to be a difficult and expensive task to perform.  
 
A project by an organization called FARM-Africa, which was carried out over a period 
of four years, surveyed resettled communities in the Northern Cape province (Kahn 
2007:13). It was found that the majority of beneficiaries are living in poverty and 
depend highly on grants for income due to low agricultural production levels (Kahn 
2007:13).  
Land reform in South Africa is not sufficiently reaching the lives of the poor, which is 
one of its primary roles as a policy intervention. Instead the policy appears to protect 
the interests of already wealthy individuals causing the existing gap between rich and 
poor to grow. Kahn (2007:23) emphasizes this point using the findings of a study 
conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council:   
            
          “New estimates of poverty show that the proportion of people living in poverty in South 
Africa has not changed significantly between 1996 and 2001. However, those 
households living in poverty have sunk deeper into poverty and the gap between rich 
and poor has widened… The poverty gap has grown faster than the economy 
indicating that poor households have not shared in the benefits of economic growth 
(Human Sciences Resource Council, 2004).” 
 
This startling fact is seen by looking at the Gini coefficient. South Africa is reported to 
have one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world. In 2009 the World Bank 
estimated South Africa’s Gini coefficient at 0.63, which then rose to 0.7 around 2013 
according to an OECD Economic Survey on South Africa (2013). The Gini coefficient 
does not compare well in that it is also higher than the world average of 0.62 (OECD 
2013:18). It appears as though the gap between rich and poor really is growing. 
Nevertheless, it was found that inequality in income has improved compared to its 
position during Apartheid, with an estimated 40% of the total improvement owing 
mainly to redistributive policies and social grants, with the total improvement being 
the result of numerous changes within the country since democracy was achieved 
(OECD 2013:18). Other poverty statistics are found in a study on poverty and 
inequality conducted by Leibbrandt et al (2010). According to results of the study 
(Table 5.2) poverty incidence varies between urban and rural regions.  
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Table 5.2  
Individual level poverty by geotype (Poverty line R515 per capita per month) 
 
Source: Leibbrandt et al (2010) 
 
We can see here that poverty in rural areas has declined from 1993 to 2008, which 
concurs with the findings of the OECD (previously discussed), however there is also 
a clear demographic shift in population from rural to urban areas. The complication of 
urbanisation introduces a different challenge to the way in which these results can be 
interpreted. It is unclear as how much of this decline in poverty in the rural areas is as 
a result of redistributive policies and how much is due to a decline in the actual 
population. 
The issue of wealth inequality prevalent in South Africa can be better understood by 
comparing the Gini coefficients of the various racial and demographic groups in the 
country. Leibbrandt et al (2010) found that the overall Gini coeficient in the country 
increased from 1993 to 2008, however the story for every population group varies. 
 
Table 5.3 








Source: Leibbrandt et al (2010) 
 
Table 5.3 shows that while the Gini coefficients across all race groups increase from 
1993 to 2008, the extent of the increases varied. Income inequality among native 
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African people rose from 0.54 in 1993 to 0.62 in 2008, which is slightly more of 
increase than the increase among white people. It is interesting to note that the rural 
income inequality actually decreased from 1993 to 2008 indicating that perhaps 
redistributive programmes have had some positive effects on these regions or that 
urbanisation may have had a hand in it, unfortunately we are unable to pinpoint the 
exact reasons behind the change. Urban income inequality rose from 0.61 in 1993 to 
0.67 in 2008, possibly owing to urbanisation. The country’s overall income inequality 
increased from 1993 to 2008 under democratic rule, which may be cause for 
concern. Whilst still unable to identify the effects of each factor contributing to 
increased income inequality, a deeper analysis and understanding is difficult to 
achieve. It is a much simpler task to reduce poverty via social grants and reform 
programmes, however inequality can only be addressed by delving into complex and 
deeply-rooted issues of shifts in education, employment and skills 
 
The process of developing land (post-transfer) appears to be the greatest issue 
arising out of land reform programmes. The Cape Land Committee has complained 
that accessing funds and grants is a major hurdle. Often the time taken to attain the 
grants is far too long and during this waiting period the land wastes away and dies 
(Kahn 2007:22). The issue of a lack of post-settlement support is not the only 
problem met on completion of transfers. Even if new landowners begin farming, they 
enter the industry that is highly competitive with local established farmers and 
international corporations, making success very difficult indeed (Kahn 2007:25).  
 
The market-led approach claims that it has significant positive effects on the 
alleviation of poverty and on equity; unfortunately the evidence that is available does 
not fully support this. Lahiff (2007:1591) finds that very little land has been reformed 
and goals are nowhere near the point of attainment. Furthermore, market workings 
tend to be abandoned during negotiations of land prices resulting in land being 
purchased for higher prices than the market would normally fetch. The resultant 
effect is that landowners’ interests remain protected and the idea of small family 
farms falls by the wayside. It appears that the majority of researchers share a similar 
opinion; that due to the slow rate of implementation, the inability to reach the poorest 
of people and to achieve its targets, the LRAD programme is not proving to be an 
effective tool in the redistribution of land and in the alleviation of poverty.  
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The questions posed earlier may be answered to some extent as the evidence shows 
that: 
1) Land reform has not yet achieved the objectives set out. 
2) The reform of land to date has contributed in some way to the wastage of 
resources and to reduced agricultural productivity. 
 
 
Both Brazil and South Africa are currently implementing ‘market-assisted’ land 
reforms, and both countries are facing and having to deal with many challenges in 
the process.  The lack of clarity in the reform policy of Brazil and the disjointed reform 
programme of South Africa leave room for skepticism and investigation. The present-
day issues are characterized by differing land ownership patterns found in the two 






























Chapter 6   Land Land everywhere, but no place to live 
 
           “Sure, cried the tenant men, but it's our land. We measured it and broke it up. We 
were born on it, and we got killed on it, died on it. Even if it's no good, it's still ours. 
That's what makes it ours-being born on it, working it, dying on it.”  
            -  John Steinbeck, The Grapes of Wrath 
 
 
The primary policies in Brazil and South Africa are categorized within the market-
assisted approach to land reform. Therefore, the state does not take complete control 
of the transactions and transfers associated with the redistribution of land; rather, the 
state enables the process while the transacting parties negotiate in order to reach an 
agreement. As will be pointed out further on in this chapter, this system is not always 
efficient and the outcomes do not always align with expectations. There are various 
reasons for the resulting inefficiencies, reasons that are often peculiar to the specific 
country in question. Hence, this chapter serves as a comparison of the performance 
of land reform policy implementation in Brazil and South Africa.  
 
6.1 Results: Brazil vs South Africa 
What is there to be learned from the experiences of land reform in Brazil and South 
Africa? Several lessons… The historical background has shaped society in both 
countries in such a distinct manner; seeming almost ingrained in an irreversible way. 
Poverty and inequality go hand in hand; creating a perfect opportunity for 
redistributive tools to make a difference. Why then is land reform not shining through 
to be all that theorists have claimed it would be? Perhaps it is not the ‘Holy Grail’ it is 
made out to be. 
 
Intended beneficiaries in both Brazil and South Africa are facing similar challenges of 
a lack of post-settlement support in the form of funding, education and skills training. 
However, somewhat of a saving grace for Brazil’s landless is that although market-
based reform is the primary policy used, the government still engages in significant 
state-led reforms to more aggressively address the needs of the poor. Conversely, in 
South Africa the market-led approach is the most relied upon method of land reform, 
resulting in the needs of the poorest of the poor not being met. In addition to this, the 
agricultural sector has diminished somewhat in South Africa due to failed land 
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transfers and the fears of existing landowners’ that they may lose control of their 
land. Fortunately for Brazil its agricultural sector has not suffered much – instead it 
has in most cases flourished due to strong liberalised trade policies and technological 
advancements. 
 
The vast difference in agricultural area between Brazil and South Africa can be seen 
in Figure 6.1 constructed using data provided by the Food and Agriculture 


























Figure 6.1: FAOSTAT (2016). 
 
The major difference in total agricultural area is a function of the proportional 
difference in the total land areas of the two countries, with South Africa being roughly 
an eighth of the size of Brazil. This difference in total land area is not a material 
concern in this discussion, what is of material significance is the difference in the 




The curve for Brazil shows that there appears to be a steady incline in the total 
agricultural area in the country, albeit a gradual incline. This could be a contributing 
factor to the growth within the agricultural sector. However, even with the increase in 
agricultural area, the average peasant worker remains landless and repressed. It 
may be possible to infer that the expansions to the agricultural area are either being 
handed over to small communities of farmers, or are owned by the large landowners, 
in which case would result in a greater inequality and poverty gap. However this is 
inconclusive as further studies would need to be conducted to establish the precise 
contributing factors to growth.  
 
Contrasting this with the curve for South Africa, it can be seen from the relatively 
shallow gradient that the agricultural area in South Africa has remained somewhat 
constant over the 11 year period. There is a very slight incline between 1995 and 
2001, after which it begins to decline minimally to rest at a constant level just below 
100 000 hectares. This rise between 1995 and 2001 is in line with the newly elected 
government and legislation that was passed at the time, and hence the end of the 
Apartheid era. The increase in agricultural area is then associated with the initiation 
of the first land reform programme that was introduced at the time as well as any 
other land transfers related to the transformation toward a democratic state. The 
constant level of agricultural area acts as some indication that the growth of the 
agricultural sector itself would most likely be stagnant or declining, as was discussed 
in Chapter 5. Considering the annual percentage change in agricultural area may 
shed more light on the growth patterns of the agricultural sectors of both countries. 
 
Figure 6.2 (FAOSTAT) compares the annual percentage growth in agricultural area 
of Brazil and South Africa. It is clear to see the diminishing yearly growth rate in 
South Africa, while most years saw positive growth changes in Brazil; evidence of the 
declining agricultural activity in South Africa compared to the flourishing agri-
business industry in Brazil. This trend of decline in agricultural productivity is similar 

































Figure 6.2: FAOSTAT (2016). 
 
The period from 2000 to 2007 saw a massive drop in employment within the 
agricultural sector of South Africa, of more than 50% (World Bank Data). The major 
losses in rural jobs, together with the diminishing agricultural sector leads to 
worsening of food security, malnourishment and lower living standards. Brazil also 
exhibits a decreasing trend which may be largely due to the technological 
enhancements made to the farming industry, but with a much more gradual decline in 
agricultural sector employment (Figure 6.3 using World Bank Data). Hence, Brazil 
faces a less severe shock to the economy than does South Africa. Although land 
redistribution is one of many factors affecting the agricultural industry, one would 
expect that the intended positive outcomes from the land reform programmes would 
be noticeable; but rather the outcomes appear to be more negative resulting in 
declining productivity (discussed in Chapter 5). Once again reiterating the inability to 




















































On the flip side of the coin, there have been some reports of positive results from 
land reform programmes, particularly from the Philippines. Proponents of land reform 
may use such cases where land reform has been successful to support their cause. 
According to Borras (2001:546), “The Philippines provides a useful case study 
because it is among the few countries today where redistributive land reform is being 
implemented with a significant degree of success”.  
 
The ‘Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme’ (CARP) was initially implemented 
in 1988, after which the results were only really evident from about 1999 onwards 
(Borras 2001). In 1999 the total population of the poor could be broken down into a 
third urban and two thirds rural (Borras 2001). This, among other factors, was one of 
the major drivers in support of policy intervention to redistribute land. The agricultural 
sector in the Philippines plays a significant role in employment within the country, and 
contributes a fair share toward GDP (Borras 2001).  
 
The call for a land reform programme, like in Brazil and South Africa, resulted out of 
the need to achieve a more equal distribution of land and thus assist in alleviating 
poverty, while also maintaining the agricultural sector that is a major source of 
employment in the country. Unfortunately, there have been marked differences in the 
outcomes of the implemented programmes, and according to Borras (2001), the 
literature available is not able to fully explain what has aided in the Philippines’ 
unexpected positive outcomes, when many were pessimistic about the CARP 
programme in the initial stages. Table 6.1 provides a comparative view of the results 
of various land reform programmes implemented across several countries, where 
results from the Philippines and South Africa (highlighted) may be compared: 
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Table 6.1 Land Reform Results from Selected Countries  
Source: Borras (2001) 
By the end of 1999 the Philippines had redistributed roughly 42% of the total agrarian 
land in the country, having a positive effect on approximately 42% of the total 
population of rural households (Borras 2001). In contrast, at the end of 2000, South 
Africa had only achieved a redistribution of 1.65% of the total agricultural land, 
reaching only 2% of the rural poor (Borras 2001). Although the time periods of 
implementation vary for these two countries, the results are still markedly different. 
 
It is, however important to note that CARP does not comply with the World Bank’s 
market-assisted approach to land reform, hence the programme tends to differ from 
those implemented in Brazil and South Africa. Nevertheless the overall goals and 
processes are similar, and thus should generally have similar outcomes if 
implemented correctly. This has not been the case. For those who support land 
reform, what is necessary to consider is not merely the needs of the country, but 
many other factors such as cultures, traditions of the natives, legacy influences on 
legal and economic structures of the country in question; to name a few. It is not 
sufficient to apply similar rules to countries with similar needs with the expectation 
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that these will all produce similar expected sets of positive results, while ignoring the 
unique characteristics of the country and its people. One may draw an analogy 
between countries with the need for wealth redistribution and sick patients. It is not 
best practice to simply prescribe the same treatment to all patients who need to be 
cured of illness; one would need to assess the cause of the illness, diagnose the type 
of illness and then prescribe the best treatment to cure that specific illness. The same 
can be said for countries requiring redistributive policies. Policy should be directed at 
addressing the needs of a country, while accounting for all unique influencing factors 
within that country. 
*** 
 
Although the South African agricultural industry has not made strides as great as 
Brazil’s, it would appear that the concentration of land in South Africa is less extreme 
than that of Brazil. The analysis implies that the Brazilian government has a more 
urgent need to address the unequal ownership patterns than does the South African 
government due to differences in severity of the problem (being that it is more severe 
in Brazil according to statistics (as found in Ch.4 and Ch.6).  
 
The idealistic land reform programme that redistributes substantial plots of land and 
supposedly provides sufficient post-settlement support to new landowners who do 
not possess the skills capacity or the capital to enter the agricultural industry is 
nothing but that – idealistic. This system is unlikely to emerge and create a lasting 
impression, and may very well be more destructive than it is useful in that while not 
achieving social justice goals it creates increased costs through losses in output and 
employment. One way such a system can achieve the above is if some kind of 
political shift were to take place prompted by the mobilisation of the rural poor into 
challenging the protected interests of the wealthy landowners and by forcing the state 
to intervene.  
 
For a government that is strongly against state intervention; a more inexpensive 
alternative would be for the government to terminate the idea of redistributing land of 
the established agribusiness industry; and possibly consider transferring land to rural 
communities that can be used for subsistence purposes. In this way, the lives of the 
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rural poor can improve and the agribusiness sector need not suffer (Atuahene 
2011:126). However, when the masses of a country are living in poverty, enabling 
subsistence farming would directly impact the land available for the agri-business 
sector, thus also influencing the economy. The unrealistic approach of transferring 
agri-business farms to the rural poor appears to be a castle in the sky; it is time the 
state looked for new solutions. 
 
Cash alternatives are another solution to alleviating poverty and redistributing 
income. Comparing this option to the redistribution of assets; it is easy to see that 
latter is far more complex and is often only effective for a specific group of individuals 
with the required resource match for the asset. It is evident that “not everyone can be 
a successful small-scale farmer” (Carter et al. 2011:1), let alone becoming a 
profitable commercial large-scale farmer. It has been found that cash transfers have 
the additional benefit of a ‘spill-over effect’ in poor households toward investments in 
children and education; an effect which is yet to be seen in most cases land 
redistribution programmes. According to Carter et al. (2011), there exists room for 
experimentation with transfer initiatives. Due to the great extent of income inequality 
and rural poverty in Brazil and South Africa, it is of utmost importance that new 
models and alternate solutions be explored that would better meet the needs of the 
most marginalised and poorest groups, while protecting future economic growth 












Chapter 7    The Path Less Travelled 
           “The ownership of land is the great fundamental fact which ultimately determines the 
social, the political, and consequently the intellectual and moral condition of a 
people.” 
          -Henry George, Progress and Poverty 
 
In most instances described the market-assisted approach to land reform in Brazil 
and in South Africa have proven to be ineffective and somewhat detrimental to both 
the rural poor and to the agricultural sector of the economy. Researchers, 
academics, economists and policy-makers seem to be in agreement that alternate 
solutions should be considered to address the issue of inequality without damaging 
the agribusiness and agricultural industries. Several variations of land reform have 
been proposed and considered. Improvements to policies and policy tools also 
feature as recommendations. Examples of possible alternate schools of thought, 
which could offer more effective shorter term improvements, are the Institutionalist 
approach and short to medium term solution of a  ‘tax reform’ on land. 
 
7.1 Alternate Angles 
Naturally, landowners and certain governmental forces of countries in which land 
reform is an issue are against any kind of radical land reform. Those with vested 
interests in land and in the agri-business sector suggest that the needs of the poor be 
met through integration into the industrial and urban sectors of the economy, rather 
than through land redistribution (Lahiff 2007:1583). Those leaning toward a more 
radical approach favour the direct intervention from the state to forcibly remove land 
from the ‘grip’ of the landowners and return the land to the poor. However, such an 
approach could have detrimental effects on the economy and particularly on 
international investor relations.  
 
Others argue that, especially in the South African case, emphasis should be placed 
on the promotion of small-scale family farms because existing large-scale 
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commercial farms tend to be inefficient (Lahiff 2007:1583), but this belief of 
inefficiency may be due to various factors such as underutilisation of land or labour – 
this does not offer sufficient reasoning for scaling down on farm size. Proponents of 
small-scale farming propose that land reform policy be restructured to focus on the 
development of family farming. However, it can be argued that if the agricultural 
sector was to be restructured to form smaller subsistence holdings the economic 
gains from the economies of scale derived from large farmlands will be forgone. One 
must ask if scaling down is the best decision for the economy of the country? Would 
a country like the United States benefit from breaking up its large agri-landholdings 
when it currently holds the number one position in the world for the production of 
exported agri-foods? The answer is no. The success of the agricultural sector of the 
mixed economy rests on the benefits that can be derived from highly-skilled and 
trained labour; a strong culture of entrepreneurship; technological advancement; 
economies of scope and of scale; and a ‘think global’ strategy that will allow for 
improved trade. By enabling the growth of the economy, the living standards of the 
general population will also improve in the long-run.  
 
It does not suffice to simply consider short-term ‘fixes’ while neglecting the long-term 
implications. While land reform may be the more ethical and morally sound solution 
to achieving equality in land ownership, it is not the best tool for the growth of a 
country’s economy. Land reform would be efficient under the conditions in which the 
recipients are highly skilled and educated to know how to manage and maintain the 
land; are able to access sufficient funding to finance operations; and who will 
continue to contribute to the economy to ensure long-term growth of the country. 
These conditions are yet to be fulfilled in Brazil and South Africa, so why then is land 
reform persisting while the poor suffer and the agricultural sector shrinks.  
 
Another option to consider is a type of reform less radical than land reform is that of 
‘tenancy reform’. The aim is not to alter the pattern of land ownership, but rather to 
improve and increase the rights held by tenants (Banerjee 1999:15). A tenancy 
reform policy might involve setting limits to the amount of rent (or share of the crop) 
that the landowner can demand from the tenant, and can incorporate protective laws 
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which ensure that landowners may not unfairly evict tenants. An effect of conducting 
a tenancy reform is that it alters the imbalance of power between the landowner and 
the tenant. Under the reform policy the tenant would be given the option to hold out 
for the share of the earnings/produce which the reform policy guarantees (Banerjee 
1999:15). In this way the tenant becomes expensive to the landowner, and the 
landowner must make a comparable offer to the tenant. This type of reform provides 
the tenant with higher incentives and greater productivity (Banerjee 1999:15). 
Another effect of this reform is the resultant long-term stake that the tenant has in the 
land due to the restriction on evictions. Since these increased rights cannot be 
traded, the future of the tenant’s family remains somewhat tied to the land; thus 
providing some level of security. With regards to productivity, tenancy reform may not 
always have a positive effect on it. However, even if productivity does not increase, 
living standards and poverty do improve (Banerjee 1999:16). While rural wage-
earners are still a key part of the economy of South Africa and Brazil, a tenancy 
reform could provide a less complex solution that can be more easily administered 
and thus reach more families faster.  It is unclear as to whether tenancy reforms can 
be used to substitute for land reform; but perhaps using a range of interventions 
would be better than relying entirely on market-assisted land reform to make a 
significant difference.  
 
The Institutionalist approach may offer a more diverse solution to achieving equality, 
however it calls for the complete restructuring of the economy for its fundamentals to 
be correctly adopted. The main ideas of this approach are as follows (Brue & Grant 
2007): 
1) The economy must be considered as a complex system from a holistic 
perspective rather than in parts. All other influences such as society, politics 
and culture should be incorporated as part of the broader economy. 
2) A focus on institutions is key. An institution defined as “an organized pattern of 
group behaviour, well established and accepted as a fundamental part of the 
culture” (Brue & Grant 2007:371).  
3) A Darwinian or evolutionary approach should be adopted to account for the 
ever-changing nature of people, societies and institutions. 
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4) The rejection of the normal state of equilibrium aimed for in neoclassical 
economics. Institutionalists believe that adjustments from equilibrium are part 
of the life of the economy and are thus in themselves normal. 
5) Not all people have similar interests, therefore there are clashes of interest to 
consider. 
6) Institutionalists favour democratic reform and are of the opinion that 
government should play a greater role in social matters. 
The main target groups of the Institutionalist approach are disadvantaged groups 
within agriculture, the labour force, and small businesses. The focus that the school 
directs at social change has made it attractive to labour unions, government 
employees and, in general, reformers (Brue & Grant 2007). Institiutionalism would 
support radical reform in order to achieve social change, hence land reform would 
too be supported but it would be viewed as a stepping stone to a more substantial 
reform and restructure of the entire economy of a country. This kind of radicalism 
which impacts the existing markets within the mixed economy of a country would not 
be welcomed by governments and large conglomerate businesses. The powers that 
be will always tend to adopt the least invasive tools so as not to alter the existing 
markets, as a means to protect capitalism and conserve the structure of the mixed 
economy.  
 
An argument for the redistribution of land from the perspective of political economy 
claims that the poor tend to have too little stake in the economy which results in 
undesirable behaviour that negatively impacts the economy, such as protesting and 
labour strikes. However, even this argument is not sufficient on its own to support the 
redistribution of land (Banerjee 1999:7). The costs incurred when redistributing land 
are substantial; and especially the opportunity costs may be even greater (Banerjee 
1999:8). According to Banerjee (1999:8), a system which extracts funds from the 
land and then redistributes these funds to the poor or invests it in public services and 




A method of extracting such funds could be through the imposition of a tax on 
landowners. Taxing the wealthy rural groups may be a version of land reform in that it 
is a method which, although it does not redistribute land, increases the resources of 
the poor by decreasing the resources of the rich. This does not mean that land 
reform should be completely ruled out and replaced with a tax system. An analysis of 
the potential costs and benefits of implementing both methods should be carried out 
prior to the initialisation of a project in order to determine the most suitable reform 
method.  
One such tax on land developed by Henry George (1839-1897) was the theory of the 
proposed ‘single-tax’ on land. The theory of the ‘single-tax’ on land is not intended to 
eliminate market forces or to induce greater state control and ownership. George 
incorporated an ethical approach to economic policy-making, which he aimed toward 
rectifying property rights issues. George observed that population growth and 
improvements in infrastructure resulted in higher demand for land which hiked up the 
market price and raised rents. In addition, the unearned increases in the higher land 
values led to landowners engaging in speculation; thereby withholding land and 
causing an inflationary effect upon the entire economy (Andelson 1994:5).  
George formulated the concept of the ‘single-tax’ on land as a means to address this 
issue; with the intended purpose being that this tax would capture any economic 
surplus created by the land ownership (Stilwell and Jordan 2004:120). It is important 
to note that the single-tax is aimed at heavily taxing the value of land in its 
unimproved state; thus buildings and any man-made improvements made to land 
(such as crop farming) are to remain untaxed or taxed at very low rates. It is the land 
itself in its natural state that should be taxed, because this land should in actuality 
belong to all; while improvements made by the landowners are a result of their efforts 
and labour and thus belong to them. The tax would then serve as a system which 
allows the generation of funds for public expenditure. The funds collected could be 
distributed by the state to the poor in the form of cash or could be invested in projects 
to improve living standards of the poor. In effect the tax allows for the redistribution of 
a portion of income which was unfairly earned by the landowners. Instead of 
landowners holding the right to claim exorbitant rents and shares of output from the 
rural poor, while enriching only themselves; the tax would act to absorb the rents 




One of the best examples of the implementation of the land tax can be found in 
Pennsylvania, USA (Cord 1969:123). The land tax has been in use since 1914. The 
reason for the implementation of the tax is that vast plots of land were owned by a 
few wealthy landowners and were being held out of use or as private parks. The land 
was underutilised and unused at a time when the state was operating inefficiently 
and corruption was a major problem. The introduction of the tax sought to increase 
efficiency by making it too expensive for landowners to withhold their large plots from 
the market and too costly to allow land to remain idle. This showed much success in 
the following years as the main objectives were reached and the adoption of the tax 
remained firmly in place. 
 
Another supporter of tax reform, Busey (1984) conducted a study on the inequality of 
wealth and income which exists in South America. The paper suggested that the 
“BEST remedy for countries suffering from land monopoly is a system which collects 
for public use the unearned values arising from land ownership, without disturbing 
possession or use of the land by its present owners.” (Busey 1984). However, Busey 
(1984) also identifies criteria and conditions that must be met in order for 
implementation of the tax to be effective. It is necessary that the process be free of 
corruption of any kind. In order to ensure this, specific measures could be put in 
place to prevent theft, fraud and bribery. The effectiveness of the land tax relies 
heavily on efficient operations of state agents as well as on fostering healthy 
relationships among landowners, the rural poor and government officials.  
 
 
Land reform need not take the form of the redistribution of actual land. The land tax 
reform is more likely to be beneficial in the short-term and hence should not be 
viewed as a means to an end. It is important that governments seriously consider the 
long-term impact of land reform. The long-run success is highly dependent on 
educating, skilling and funding the intended recipients of land before the land is 
actually redistributed for there to be a positive effect on economic growth. The 
success of land reform also rests upon the alignment of goals of all parties involved. 
The intended beneficiaries should have similar productivity goals as the state in order 
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for agricultural growth to be pursued. The process of adequately equipping the 
intended recipients of the land is a long and complex one which requires urgent 
attention from the state. While placing the intended recipients of land in such 
educational programmes, the land tax would be an efficient short-term solution to not 
only achieve some of the objectives of land reform more effectively than land 
redistribution, but it is also likely to have positive effects on production, labour 


























Chapter 8     And in Closing 
 
8.1 Recapitulation of aims 
The aim of the dissertation was to establish whether the land reform policies which 
are being implemented in Brazil and South Africa are making a significant difference 
in achieving the goals of rural poverty alleviation and the attainment of wealth/income 
equality, while also assessing the effects that the policies are having on the 
agricultural sector of the market, and thus the economy overall. Finally, alternate 
solutions are proposed to address the shortcomings of conventional land reform. 
 
 
8.2 Key points of the literature 
The purpose of land reform is to redistribute land in order to attain equity. The 
redistribution of land acts to transfer property rights to disadvantaged groups. The 
aim of land reform programmes is to alleviate poverty and raise living standards 
within a country. Property rights are essential in that it sets the economic and social 
environment in which people may interact. When property rights are weak, unequal 
societies prevail. 
 
The ownership of land can be categorized as communal, private and state-owned. 
Land reform tends to focus on altering the disproportionate pattern of ownership in 
private property. It has become increasingly popular in the developing world. The 
World Bank plays a key role in assisting developing countries with the 
implementation of land reform programmes. Success has been reported in some 
cases, such as in the Philippines, where the characteristics and size of the economy 
is different to that of Brazil and South Africa. However, failures of land reform have 
been common in many countries, for example in Eastern and Central Europe, as well 
as Mexico and Zimbabwe.  
 
The study focuses on the assessment of redistributive land reform; a topic at the 
forefront of land conflicts in Brazil and South Africa. In Brazil the colonization by the 
Portuguese greatly influenced land ownership patterns, resulting in very few wealthy 
families owning the majority of the land. This has led to Brazil having one of the most 
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unequal distributions of income in the world. Both ‘market-assisted’ and state-led 
land reform programmes have been implemented. However, there have been 
numerous problems and cases of failure. In South Africa, before western influences 
infiltrated the country, communal land ownership was the norm until the country was 
colonized and the capitalist economy was introduced. Thereafter, Apartheid placed 
racial restrictions on native African groups which have significantly impacted on the 
ownership patterns seen today. South Africa has adopted policies for both 
redistribution and restitution. However, the focus of this study is on redistribution. 
Like Brazil, South Africa too has implemented the ‘market-assisted’ approach to land 
reform. South African land reform policy has been widely criticized for being 
disjointed and problematic, while being implemented inefficiently where the intended 
beneficiaries are not able to maintain the land after taking ownership, resulting in 
degradation and neglect of the once economically productive land. 
 
 
8.3 Results of the analysis 
In Brazil, land ownership is dominated by large estates which are owned by a few 
wealthy landowners. This has resulted in the inefficient use of land and major income 
inequalities. Although the agricultural sector was somewhat neglected in the mid-
1900s; the 1990s brought with it a boom in the agricultural industry which arose out 
of newly issued liberalized trade policies. Brazil has become a key producer and 
trader in the global markets for various goods, such as coffee and beef. However, the 
poor masses did not reap the rewards and remained in poverty due to the political 
power held by agribusiness forces. This gave rise to the MST gaining momentum 
and land conflicts grew. Government turned to land reform to appease the masses. 
Unfortunately most cases have not been very successful. Resettled groups face a 
lack of technical assistance, training, access to credit, and education – resulting in 
the abandonment of the land. The agricultural industry continues to flourish while the 
Gini coefficient remains too high. Income and wealth inequality persist.  
 
At the end of Apartheid, white people owned the majority of the land in South Africa. 
The agricultural industry was characterised by both large-scale commercial holdings 
and small-scale farms. Land reform programmes were implemented to assist the 
previously disadvantaged groups. However, the democratic state is conservative with 
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regard to any radical approach to land reform in order to protect the agribusiness 
industry and maintain investor relations. This has resulted in very slow progress 
being made. The ‘market-assisted’ approach has proven to be ineffective in reaching 
the neediest groups. In addition, those who do benefit experience inadequate post-
settlement assistance and often fail to bring the land to full productive capacity or 
they experience much difficulty when attempting to break into the market. Other 
beneficiaries merely revert to traditional economies of subsistence farming, shrinking 
agricultural productivity. As a result the agricultural sector in South Africa has 
declined, with rural labour being negatively impacted. The land reform goals have 
been far too unrealistic. 
 
Alternate suggestions and amendments to land reform policies include, but are not 
limited to: emphasis of the state on small-scale family farming rather than commercial 
farming for those who do not have the required resource capacity and depending on 
the size of the population being targeted; tenancy reform which would be less 
harmful to the economy and would provide some level of protection to tenants; or a 
direct redistribution of funds possibly via the implementation of a land tax. 
 
8.4 Limitations and Recommendations 
While conducting the research it was found that there are various limitations with 
regard to the scope and availability of existing work. While Brazilian land reform has 
been more extensively researched, South African related research is very limited on 
this topic. Statistical economic analysis specifically is rather limited for both countries 
due to very limited data availability.  Land reform from an economic perspective is 
uncommon in South African literature, the focus is primarily from a legal outlook in 
much of the existing discourse. A limitation pertinent to both countries is the lack of 
more recent data and studies; most studies tend to have been conducted many years 
ago, hence not accounting for any recent changes. Furthermore, no efforts have 
been made by government itself to assess the effects of land reform policy on a 
country-wide scale, the assessments of results have been confined mainly to small 
regions or specific cases of land reform.  
 
It is recommended that researchers be encouraged to participate in South African 
research studies within the area of land reform and redistribution in order to expand 
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the pool of resources available, especially from an economic perspective. Increased 
interest from economists is required for there to be greater economic coverage; and 
government should play a more active role in assessing its policy implementation 
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